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ABSTRACT 
 
Canada has been recognized as the largest exporter of flax seed in the world.  
Currently, very little flax straw is further processed, despite its potential as a value added 
product, with only about 7-10% of Canadian flax seed producers harvesting residual flax 
straw rather than burning the straw. A traditional use of flax straw has been for the 
production of fibre for the linen industry.  Interest in flax fibre has been rekindled with 
the impetus to seek out bioproducts that replace non-renewal resources and provide 
value-added opportunities for agricultural producers. Flax fibre also has a range of 
potential uses in automotive parts, geotextiles, insulation material, etc. Despite this 
potential, the Canadian flax fibre sector remains largely underdeveloped, with fledgling 
supply chains and lack of investment in the necessary processing capacity. This paper 
develops a framework for analysing the relational exchanges at different stage of the 
supply chain to determine if the paucity in investment is the result of prohibitively high 
exchange costs. 
A number of distinct stages in the flax fibre supply chain can be identified: 
farmers producing flax seed and/or straw; processors who extract the natural fibre from 
the straw; and manufacturers who use the fibre in their products.  The paper develops a 
framework that draws together insights from Transaction Cost Economics, Agency 
Theory and Bargaining Theory. The role of institutions in facilitating quality 
measurement and providing participants with information is also considered.  The 
theoretical framework identifies asset specificity, agency measurement costs, bargaining 
power and under-developed institutions as key factors in the development of the flax 
 iii 
 
fibre sector. From the theoretical framework, a set of propositions is developed that 
examine the anticipated effect of these factors on vertical coordination in the sector.  
The theoretical propositions are explored through a series of semi-structured 
interviews with parties at each stage of the supply chain (producers, fibre processors, 
final manufacturers), as well as with industry experts. Information from the interviews is 
used to identify the transaction characteristics and the institutional framework 
characterizing the flax fibre sector in Canada. This is analysed through a comparative 
case study approach with the flax fibre sector in Europe, and the wool fibre sector in New 
Zealand as an example of a fully developed and long-standing fibre sector. By also noting 
the different vertical coordination strategies that are present in these supply chains, a 
connection is drawn between the presence of certain transaction characteristics and the 
corresponding cost-minimizing exchange relationships. The case studies are used to 
investigate the propositions developed from the theoretical framework regarding the 
impact of transaction characteristics on the optimal vertical coordination strategy and the 
impediments to development and investment in the sector. 
The propositions developed in the framework are verified to a great extent by the 
comparative case study.  The uncertainty in the exchange environment regarding the 
future direction of the flax fibre industry and the high measurement costs due to the 
absent quality and grading regime in the Canadian flax fibre set the two industries apart 
from each other.  Both of these dimensions impact the exchange costs of a transaction 
and subsequently, the extent to which the parties are closely coordinated.  The case 
studies verify that using a framework to analyze transactions provides additional insights 
because of the joint consideration of several features of the transaction. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 Canada is the largest exporter of flax seed in the world.  The flax plant is 
generally viewed as an easy crop to manage and it is used in rotation with other crops on 
the prairies.  The flax plant is a dual-purpose plant  oil and fibre.  The oilseed is used 
mainly for industrial purposes, such as flooring and paint varnishes.  There is also a 
variety of oilseed flax that is edible and has various health benefits.1   Flax can be 
harvested for either its fibrous straw or its high quality oilseed, with different varieties 
available for each purpose.  In Canada, however, only the oilseed variety is available to 
producers. In other areas of the world, flax is harvested specifically for its fibre and 
farmers derive their income from marketing the straw.  For instance, producers in western 
European countries such as Belgium and France harvest high quality flax straw that is 
further processed with the fibre destined for linen manufacturers in Asia.  In Canada, 
however, the flax plant is cultivated for its oilseed with producers deriving their revenue 
from marketing the oilseed.  The fibrous flax straw is viewed as a nuisance.  This is in 
spite of the fact that straw from the oilseed variety of flax also contains potentially 
valuable fibre.  The usage rate of oilseed flax straw is very low, leaving much of the 
straw to be burned in fields.  Approximately 7-10 percent of available flax straw was 
used for further processing in 2001 (SAFRR, 2005a).    
In recent years, however, flax fibre has received more attention.  Interest in flax 
fibre has been in part rekindled.  There is an interested by policy makers in bioproducts 
                                                
1 This variety of flax, Linola, accounts for only a small fraction of flax acres 
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because of their potential to replace non-renewal resources and to provide value-added 
opportunities for agricultural producers.  A bioproduct is defined as a commercial or 
industrial product (other than food or feed) that utilizes biological products or renewable 
domestic agricultural (plant, animal, or marine) or forestry products (BioAlberta, 2005). 
Oilseed flax straw has the potential to produce fibre of adequate quality for various 
industrial applications.  Canadian produced flax fibre can be used in automotive parts, 
geotextiles2, pulp sweetners3 insulation material, and various other industrial applications 
(SAFRR, 2004b).  When used for industrial purposes, flax fibre serves mainly as an 
additive in the manufacturing process.  Research to date has indicated that flax fibre has 
superior strength characteristics and can compete effectively with other chemically based 
strengthening agents (AAFRD, 2003).     
The flax fibre industry is still in its infancy and, thus far, its growth has been 
slow.  The large number of acres devoted to flax in Canada means that there is a large 
volume of flax straw available for value added processing.  Despite the large potential for 
utilizing this valuable by-product, growth at all stages of the supply chain has been 
stagnant, or growing very slowly.   Entry into the industry has been slow, with only a 
handful of processors of flax straw currently operating in Canada.  Similarly, 
manufacturers have been slow to adopt flax fibre in their production processes.   
1.2 Problem Statement 
 Traditional neoclassical economics examines industries and firms primarily from 
a production point of view.  Slow industry growth can thus be explained by technological 
                                                
2 Geotextiles are a mesh of fibres (including flax fibres) that are used at road, railroad, and building sites to 
reduce the levels of dust and erosion that are produced during construction (SAFRR, 2004b).  
3 Pulp sweetners are the addition of extra strong fibre into a pulp mix of recycled paper to give it the 
necessary strength. 
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difficulties creating high production costs that limit profitability in production.  This 
thesis takes a different approach.  Slow industry growth is not viewed from a production 
point of view but from a transaction point of view.  Business relationships are necessary 
in a supply chain to move the product between stages of production, or to market the 
product to downstream buyers.  Efficient marketing is the ability to move a product 
through the supply chain at the least cost, and eventually capture a segment of consumers 
willing to pay the price for the products bundle of attributes (Kohls, 1967).  Following 
New Institutional Economics (NIE), the efficiency of exchange relationships is measured 
in terms of transaction costs.  Prevailing business relationships thus minimize transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1986a). 
The lack of development in the flax fibre industry is hypothesised to be related to 
the efficiency of marketing in the supply chain.    It is therefore proposed that inefficient 
marketing, or the inefficiency of business relationships in a supply chain plays a role in 
the slow development of an industry.   
The premise of this thesis is that there are several factors in the transaction, the 
transaction environment and the characteristics of the transacting parties that are creating 
high exchange costs for existing and potential participants in the Canadian flax fibre 
supply industry.  These high exchange costs are prohibiting or slowing the development 
of the sector due to the requirement of closely vertically coordinated relationships in the 
industry.     
1.3 Objectives 
 This thesis has several components tied to fulfilling particular objectives.    The 
first objective is to provide an overview of the current state of the industry and identify 
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issues that characterize the industry.  Therefore, the main players in the supply chain and 
their roles, as well as the environment in which they carry out exchanges, are presented.  
Through this examination of the industry, critical elements will be identified that 
influence different features of the transactions.   
The second main objective is to comprehensively characterize transactions.  
Different concepts of NIE, as well as other constructs are combined in a theoretical 
framework.  A framework, as opposed to a model, allows a number of different concepts 
to be incorporated for analyzing a problem.  Therefore, the analysis is not limited to a 
single theoretical construct.  The framework includes a number of concepts from NIE to 
not only analyze the exchange relationship, but also gain an insight into the transaction 
environment and the characteristics of the exchange parties.   The framework develops 
propositions to examine how exchange costs stemming from each of the different 
concepts affect coordination between participants in the sector.  Given the paucity of data 
available pertaining to the flax fibre industry, the development of the theoretical 
framework regarding business transactions constitutes the largest component of this 
thesis.  
The third and final objective of the thesis is to investigate the propositions 
developed in the theoretical framework.  Given the limitations of data in the Canadian 
flax fibre industry, an appropriate technique must be used to examine the propositions 
developed in the theoretical framework.  A verification of the propositions on the 
anticipated effect on vertical coordination is undertaken using comparative case studies.  
A number of dimensions of transactions and the corresponding vertical strategies in the 
flax fibre industry will be compared to those in another natural fibre industry; wool fibre.    
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1.4 Focus of the Thesis 
Given positive transaction costs, prevailing business exchanges will be efficient in 
the sense that they minimize transaction costs.  Transaction costs result from various 
different elements.  Therefore, business relationships should be examined from different 
perspectives to generate an in-depth understanding of all of the different sources of 
transaction costs and their impact on vertical coordination strategies.  It is assumed that 
the interaction of transaction costs, the institutional environment in which the transaction 
takes place, and the characteristics of the transacting parties all contribute to the ultimate 
cost of transacting.  Therefore, the main argument in this thesis is that examining vertical 
coordination through several different lenses, results in a more robust prediction 
regarding prevailing exchange relationships.  This prediction requires the analyst to 
consider the characteristics of the business relationship, the parties in the business 
relationship, and the environment in which they transact.    By considering all of these 
elements jointly greater accuracy of predictions regarding the vertical coordination 
strategies that will emerge are enhanced by a joint consideration of these elements.   
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
 This thesis is comprised of six chapters.  The next chapter is the industry 
background chapter and provides an overview of the current state of the Canadian flax 
fibre industry and several characteristics that represent issues for the industrys 
development.   Chapter three provides a brief overview of the different aspects of the 
literature that will be used in the comprehensive theoretical framework.  Previous 
applications of the literature are also included in the literature review chapter.  The 
theoretical framework follows in chapter four.  This chapter develops several 
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propositions about vertical coordination strategies.  Each of the propositions regarding 
vertical coordination is developed from a different strand of the literature.  Therefore, the 
propositions cover all of the relevant features of transactions in the Canadian flax fibre 
industry.  In chapter five, a comparative case study analysis to investigate the 
propositions follows the theoretical framework developed in chapter four.  The 
comparative case study analysis is comprised of a comparison of the features of the 
transaction, as well as a comparison of the vertical coordination strategies in similar 
industries.  Finally, the last chapter includes the conclusions, suggestions for further 
research and some limitations of the research.    
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2.0 INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to flax fibre and flax 
fibre supply chains in Canada.  Flax fibre production and processing in Canada was 
prominent at the end of the nineteenth century but has significantly decreased since that 
time.  In recent years, however, with the impetus to seek out bioproducts that replace 
non-renewable resources and provide value-added opportunities for agricultural 
producers, a blossoming Canadian flax fibre industry appears a possibility.  Despite this 
new interest, however, the Canadian flax fibre sector continues to be largely 
underdeveloped, with fledgling supply chains and lack of investment in the necessary 
processing capacity.  This chapter concludes with an outline of some key factors that 
appear to play a role in the lethargic development of the industry.         
2.1.1 Introduction to Flax Fibre 
 Flax straw contains a valuable fibre that can be used in many different 
applications, ranging from textile production to additives in construction materials, to 
inputs into automotive parts.   Louis Hebert, a European settler, first introduced the flax 
plant to Canada in 1617 (Flax Council, 2005).4  At that time the flax plant was mainly 
grown for the production of fibre for linen.  However, the introduction of mechanized 
cotton fibre extractors during the Industrial Revolution, and the introduction of synthetic 
fibres shortly after World War II, quickly eroded the market share of flax fibre.  The 
natural flax fibres quality variability made it difficult for it to compete with standardized 
                                                
4 The first known use of flax fibre dates back to 3000 B.C. when it was used for producing linen (Flax 
Council, 2005).   
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blends of cotton and man-made synthetic fibres.   As a result flax was no longer grown 
for its fibre in Canada after the second half of the twentieth century.  In several Western 
European countries, however, producers of flax especially for the fibre have remained 
active and have perfected their production of high quality fibre to meet linen 
manufacturers demands. 
All of the flax fibre currently produced in Canada is derived from oilseed flax 
straw, which is a byproduct of the harvest of oilseed flax in Canada.  Approximately 1.3 
million acres of oilseed flax were harvested in Canada in the 2004 crop season (AAFRD, 
2005).  The majority of flax is harvested in Saskatchewan where 1 million flax acres were 
harvested in 2004 (SAFRR, 2005b).  In Saskatchewan, there are approximately 13,000-
18,000 farmers who harvest oilseed flax annually.     An oilseed flax producer is left with 
about ¾ tonnes of straw per acre of oilseed flax after the oilseed has been harvested.  
Therefore, there is close to a million tonnes of flax straw available for value added 
processing in Canada.  Processing of flax straw for downstream manufacturing, however, 
has been limited.  In 2001, of the one million tonnes of flax straw available for use in 
Canada, only 230,000 tonnes were processed according to one study (AAFRD, 2003).  
Background research in the industry indicated however, that the largest processor of flax 
straw purchases between 100,000 and 120,000 tonnes of straw yearly.  Therefore, the 
exact usage rate of flax straw is currently somewhat uncertain.      
Currently, the fibrous straw of oilseed flax is viewed as a waste product and most 
producers find it cumbersome to handle.  Producers who cannot sell their straw to 
processors generally burn the straw in their fields, since it is costly to bale and store the 
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straw.5  New uses for flax fibre are emerging that would eliminate the problem of burning 
flax straw in the field.  In recent years, flax fibre has been gaining attention as a natural 
alternative to petrochemicals and other non-renewable raw materials in various industrial 
products.  As will be explored in the next section, flax straw processing and flax fibre 
utilization could be advantageous for the environment in several ways.     
2.2 The Role of Flax Fibre in the Biobased Economy  
Flax fibre is capable of transforming many industrial products into bioproducts 
because it is a renewable resource obtained from a plant.6  The broad term bioproduct 
includes non-food products of plants including biopharmaceuticals, industrial products 
such as biofuels and bioplastics, as well as products for pollution cleanup and prevention 
(CARC, 2003).  Bioproducts have an environmental advantage because they replace 
some of the polluting chemicals or non-renewable fossil fuels inputs with natural 
renewable resources.  The use of renewable resources in the production of such industrial 
products as plastic and paper is anticipated to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases as 
well as limit the emission of toxins into the air, land and water (Crawford, 2001).  Using 
flax fibre as an input can therefore alleviate some of the environmental damage caused in 
the production of plastic composites and paper.  Development of a biobased economy 
would aid the government of Canada to attain the goals of the Kyoto Protocol.  Canada 
ratified the Protocol in 2002, and has thereby agreed to reduce greenhouse gases six 
percent below their 1990 levels by the period 2009-2012 (Government of Canada, 2002).    
Furthermore, the utilization of flax straw in flax fibre processing eliminates flax straw 
burning in the fields, which releases harmful carbon dioxide into the environment.  
                                                
5 Unlike some cereal straws, flax straw is not very suitable for animal bedding 
6 There are currently no apparent standards regarding renewable resource content for a product to qualify as 
a bioproduct. 
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Potential end use of flax fibre derived from Canadian grown oilseed flax will be 
discussed later in the chapter.     
2.3 Components of the Flax Plant 
There are two main types of flax plants: long line flax and oilseed flax.  The long 
line variety of flax produces straw of up to 1 meter in length and the resultant fibres are 
generally longer than 50 centimeters.  Long line flax is grown primarily for fibre that is 
used in the production of linen.  Production of long line flax takes place on a relatively 
large scale in Europe, where high quality fibre is produced primarily in France, Belgium 
and the Netherlands (AAFRD, 2003).  The long line variety of flax is currently not grown 
commercially in Canada, mainly due to the perception that the dry weather on the prairies 
makes the production of high quality fibre unattainable.7  The yield and quality of the 
oilseed obtained from this plant is low and considered a byproduct.  The oilseed variety 
of flax, on the other hand, has a shorter stem, approximately 50 centimeters, and thus 
produces shorter fibres.  Fibre content8 can range from a high of 40 percent in a long line 
variety of flax to a low of 8 percent in an oilseed variety of plant (SAFRR, 2004b).   
Therefore, while the oilseed yield is high and of good quality, the fibre yield from the 
short straw is low and of lower quality.  When the producer intends to use a flax crop for 
oilseed revenue, the producer will plant the short variety of flax and regard straw as a 
byproduct.  There are currently no long line varieties of flax licensed and available for 
producers to purchase and seed in Canada.    
                                                
7 Dry weather negatively impacts the length of the plant as well as the quality of the fibre. 
8 The ratio of fibre in a given straw sample. 
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2.3.1 The Oilseed  
Canada has been the largest exporter of flax oilseed in the world since 1994 (Flax 
Council, 2004).  The oilseed from the flax plant can be used for both industrial products 
and for the improvement of human and animal diets.  Linseed oil extracted from the 
oilseed is used as a base in many sealant industrial products, which is a well-established 
industry.  In recent years, however, the health benefits of the linola oilseed variety of flax 
have come to the forefront.  The fatty acids of the oilseed are useful as a nutritional 
supplement to reduce high cholesterol (Flax Council, 2005).   
While there appears to be a possibility of growth in the market for oilseed, the 
expansion of acres planted with flax is not reflecting this potential.  Industry observers 
have suggested that the expansion is hindered, in part, because of producers difficulty 
with managing the straw (SAFRR, 2004a).  Therefore, the development of a value added 
flax straw market would also provide benefits to the value added oilseed flax sector.     
2.3.2 The Straw 
Unlike cereal straw, flax straw is not particularly suitable for animal bedding, and 
its long and tough structure makes it difficult to work into the soil after harvesting the 
oilseed.  Industry observers estimate that approximately 90 percent of farmers collect the 
straw in their field and burn it.  However, with appropriate straw management, the 
potential end uses of flax straw and fibre greatly increases.       
Besides the choice of variety, the fibre content and quality of flax straw is 
influenced by several elements.  Management of oilseed flax straw plays an important 
role in obtaining high quality fibre; however none of the oilseed flax straw is managed in 
Canada.  Some management practices that play an important role in fibre content and 
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quality are: harvesting the seed without putting the straw through the combine, placing 
the straw evenly in contact with the soil to improve retting, and measuring fibre content 
to determine the potential of the straw (Saskflax, 2005).   
An important aspect of flax straw management is the retting process.  Retting 
essentially means to rot the straw to some extent to start the process of releasing the fibre.  
The retting process softens the pectin and lignin, which are glue-like substances that bind 
the bast fibre with the inner core of the straw.  The retting process begins when the straw 
is laid out in rows in the field and makes contact with the soils moisture and bacteria.  
The length of the retting process depends on the soils moisture content and climatic 
conditions. The process can take anywhere from a few weeks to months, depending on 
the weather conditions.  In Canada, producers only allow a few weeks for the retting 
process, which is generally not enough time to properly ret the straw.  Producers want to 
prepare their fields for spring seeding before the winter starts, leaving little time for the 
straw to ret in the field.  A successful retting technique has arguably the greatest effect on 
fibre content and quality.  The success of the retting process is determined by the 
interaction of the dew, rain, sun and the soil-borne bacteria of the field.9  Hot and moist 
weather is ideal for the bacteria and micro flora to grow and start the retting process.  
Once retting is finished, the straw is baled into large round bales that are shipped on 
trucks to nearby processors stockyards where they are stored until the mill is ready to 
                                                
9 The retting process can take place in the farmers field as well as in a laboratory using chemicals, steam, 
ultrasound or enzymes.  Generally the retting process is more even in a controlled laboratory setting, 
making straw processing more efficient.  However, the majority of flax straw around the world is retted in 
the field because of the high cost of retting straw in a laboratory.   
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process the straw.  Flax straw is generally not stored longer than one winter because it is 
bulky and takes up considerable room.10     
2.3.3 The Fibre 
The fibre contained in flax straw is classified as a bast fibre.  Bast fibre is 
obtained from a stalk that has a woody inner part and a fibrous outer layer.  Bast fibres 
are found in the stems of plants as opposed to fibres found in leaves or seedpods 
(SAFRR, 2004a).  The woody inner core of the flax plant is known as the shive.  The 
fibre is released from the shive to some extent during the retting process.  Flax fibre 
processors prefer successfully retted straw because it makes fibre extraction easier and it 
results in longer and cleaner fibres (SAFRR, 2004a).   
Fibre from unmanaged oilseed flax straw is of generally low quality and therefore 
only suitable for low value uses.  There is currently no management of flax straw taking 
place in Canada.  The low value of Canadian flax straw limits the interest by potential 
buyers.  Currently, only specialty paper manufacturers and building material 
manufacturers, who do not demand high quality fibre, are purchasing Canadian flax fibre.  
The total value of flax fibre exports range from $20 to $30 million annually (SAFRR, 
2004b).  However, the fibrous quality of (managed) oilseed flax straw makes it suitable 
for the production of pulp sweetners, insulation material, composite materials and 
cottonized flax (SAFRR, 2004b). The next section of this chapter will look at some of the 
potential end uses of Canadian produced flax fibre.   
2.4 Potential End Uses of Flax Fibre 
 A likely use of Canadian flax fibre is as an additive or strengthening agent in 
various applications.  Flax fibre would compete with other strengthening agents such as 
                                                
10 Flax straw can be stored for several years and the quality of fibre will not decrease to a great extent 
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natural wood fibre, as well as non-wood natural fibres such as hemp and kenaf.  As in 
other competitive input markets, for flax fibre to be used as an input, it must either be 
cost effective or create a higher valued product.  One apparently successful and growing 
market for flax fibre is as an input for composite materials.  
2.4.1 Composite Materials 
Plant fibres have been found to be a good replacement for glass fibre in composite 
materials.  It was estimated that for the period 2000-2005, consumption of all natural 
fibres for non-textile uses was expected to have an annual growth rate of fifty-three 
percent in North America (AAFRD, 2003).  Composite materials can be defined as all 
products that are made up of a combination of different materials that are bonded together 
physically.  In 2000, eight million pounds of flax fibre was used in the North American 
plastic composite market (AAFRD, 2003).11  The natural strength of flax fibre makes it 
highly suitable as a strengthener in the manufacturing of composite materials.  The plastic 
composite market can be divided into the following segments: building products, 
industrial/consumer segment, automotive segment and infrastructure/marine segment 
(AAFRD, 2003).   
The automotive sector in Europe is at the forefront of incorporating some flax 
fibre reinforced material in their cars.12  The automotive sector requires large volumes of 
consistent quality fibre for their production line and the natural variability of flax straw 
has made it difficult for flax fibre processors to provide a consistent supply (SAFRR, 
2004b).  According to one automotive supplier in Germany, their demand for natural 
materials is dependent on the ability of processors to deliver a consistent supply of even 
                                                
11 Wood flour accounted for 96 percent of the 401 million pounds of natural fibre consumed in North 
America in 2000 (AAFRD, 2003). 
12 Short fibres that are a by-product of long line fibre processing are used for these plastic composites. 
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quality fibre (MAFRI, 2005).  In the construction industry, the use of natural fibres in 
decking is the largest and fastest growing segment of the market with an annual growth 
rate of 60 percent from 2000-2005 (AAFRD, 2003).  Currently, only one Canadian flax 
processor is selling its product as an additive in construction materials.  The majority of 
Canadian flax fibre is utilized as a pulp sweetner in specialty paper manufacturing. 
2.4.2 Pulp Sweetners 
Canadian flax fibre has been used in the specialty paper industry for many years 
as a pulp sweetner.  A pulp sweetner is the extra strong fibre that is added to a pulp mix 
of recycled paper.  Traditionally, wood fibres are the primary raw material for pulp and 
paper production but the rising demand for fibre in the paper industry is creating a 
worldwide shortage of pulp strengtheners (AAFRD, 2003).  Flax fibre, which is a suitable 
substitute of wood flour is seen as a product that can alleviate some of this shortage 
(AAFRD, 2003).  Plant fibres such as flax and hemp already play an important role in the 
niche markets for specialty papers and also for enhancing pulps based on recycled paper.  
The wider application of flax fibre in pulp and paper milling is therefore seen as a 
potential application of flax fibre.  Flax fibre is a worthwhile fibre in this application 
because it is significantly stronger and longer than wood fibres, which means that a 
smaller amount of flax needs to be used in the pulp mixture (SAFRR, 2004b).  The two 
largest flax fibre processors in Canada supply specialty paper manufacturers that use it as 
a pulp sweetner.  The quality of flax fibre does not need to be very high for this market 
segment and it is therefore a good outlet for an infant flax fibre industry where the 
participants are sill learning good practices (Karus et al, 2000).          
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2.4.3 Insulation Material   
In many countries the market for ecologically produced insulation is growing 
faster than the traditional insulation market.  When plant fibres are used to replace glass 
fibre it provides potential health, energy and environmental benefits (AAFRD, 2003).  An 
additional benefit of using flax fibre insulation, as opposed to fibreglass, is that it can be 
more easily decomposed when its useful life is over (SAFRR, 2004b).  The global market 
for insulation made from bast fibres is estimated at 1 million tonnes (Western Economic 
Diversification, 2005).  The use of flax fibre as an input in the insulation sector is popular 
in new and inexperienced flax producing countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany and the Scandinavian countries.   The further development of this market, 
however, is dependent upon the lowering of production costs of insulation materials 
made from flax fibre (Karus et al., 2000).   
2.4.4 Cottonized Flax 
Ultimate fibres are the small bundles of tiny fibres in the bast fibre that can be 
used in weaving.   Cottonized flax is derived from the ultimate fibres that could be spun 
on cotton equipment (SAFRR, 2004b).  Cottonized flax fibre has the potential to capture 
some of the textile market that is currently dominated by cotton fibres and synthetic 
materials.  Flax fibre has superior moisture absorbing qualities in comparison to cotton, 
making clothes with cottonized flax fibre cooler and drier during hot and humid days.  
The extraction process of these ultimate fibres has, to date, only been possible with 
evenly retted straw,13.  Straw retted in the field is often not even because it is difficult to 
align straw such that all of it makes even contact with the soils bacteria and weather 
conditions also play a factor in the unevenness of retting.   Straw that is retted in a 
                                                
13 Retting done in a laboratory, for example. 
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laboratory will generate evenly retted straw but its high cost means that cottonized flax is 
to date not able to compete with the lower priced cotton fibre.  However, researchers 
have had recent breakthroughs in finding ways to reduce the costs of producing a more 
consistent, lower cost fibre.  Thus, there appears to be a growing potential to build 
processing plants that produce cottonized flax that can compete on a cost basis with 
cotton (SAFRR, 2004b).   
The supply chain of short flax fibre for an industrial application is comprised of 
only a few stages of production.  The next section will explore the different stages of a 
flax fibre supply chain.   
2.5 The Canadian Flax Fibre Supply Chain 
The supply chain of long line fibre in the textile industry is longer than for short 
line fibre, with more stages of production because textile manufacturers desire high 
quality and clean fibre.  Flax fibre intended for use in industrial products tends to go 
through a much shorter supply chain with fewer stages of production.  Currently, the 
oilseed flax fibre supply chain in Canada is comprised of three separable stages of 
production.  These stages are: producers of flax, processors of flax straw and 
manufacturers of industrial products using flax fibre.  Producers of flax are mainly 
located in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, with only a small number in Alberta.  There are 
two flax straw processors located in Winkler, Manitoba: Schweitzer-Mauduit Canada Inc. 
and Ecusta Fibres Ltd.  The third Canadian commercially operating flax straw processor 
is Bio-Fibre Industries Ltd. and it is located in Canora, Saskatchewan  
There are currently no brokers, auctions, or middlemen in the Canadian flax straw 
and flax fibre market.  There are also no stages in the supply chain where quality 
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measurement by an independent party takes place to grade and sort the straw or fibre, 
except for cellulose content.  There are a few service industries that mainly transport the 
raw material from one stage of production to the next.  For example, independent custom 
balers are hired by the processors to bale the straw for producers and transport the straw 
bales with their trucks to the processor.  After processing, the flax fibre is generally 
transported in trucks by the processor to the rail cars that ship it to the US.     
A simple diagram of a typical Canadian oilseed flax fibre supply chain with the 
main players and their responsibilities, as well as the quality measurements that take 
place, is depicted in figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 A Typical Canadian Flax Fibre Supply Chain 
 
Producer of 
oilseed flax: 
~ produces oilseed 
flax as a rotation crop 
~ contacts processor 
when ready to 
combine  
~ harvests oilseed and 
drops straw behind 
the combine 
Flax straw 
processor: 
~ calculates necessary 
tonnage of straw 
~ contracts out baling 
and trucking of straw 
~ stores straw on yard 
until ready for processing
~ extracts fibre from the 
flax stalk 
~ arranges shipment of 
fibre to manufacturer 
Manufacturer: 
~ manufactures 
specialty paper or 
building material 
~  forecasts demand 
for fibre 
~ sends monthly 
purchase orders for 
fibre 
Quality Measurement: 
In-house testing of: colour, fibre 
length and moisture content of 
each bale 
Laboratory testing of cellulose 
content of a shipment of fibre 
bales 
Usually 
Spot Market 
Transaction
Usually 
Fully 
Integrated 
Quality Measurement: 
During cropping season: straw 
field is visually inspected for stem 
length and cleanliness of the field 
During harvest: straw is hand 
inspected for the degree of ret and 
moisture content  
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 Straw buyers, who work for the processors, carry out the quality measurement of 
straw.  The processor and manufacturer of the fibre measure the quality of flax fibre.   
An independent laboratory close to the two largest processors of flax straw in 
Canada measures the cellulose content14 of fibre samples before the fibre is shipped to the 
U.S. 
2.6 Industry Associations 
There are currently no industry associations in the Canadian flax fibre industry.  
Most of the information that is available to supply chain participants and potential 
entrants is from oilseed flax industry associations.  The Flax Council of Canada and the 
Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission are two prominent oilseed flax industry 
associations providing some information about flax straw and fibre.   There are also no 
known natural fibre associations in Canada to disseminate information about flax fibre 
market prospects, flax fibre properties, or its potential uses.   
The Flax Council of Canada is a national organization that represents producers, 
grain handlers, shippers, exporters and end-users of oilseed flax.  The Flax Councils 
mandate is flax market development, market and production research and crop promotion 
(Flax Council, 2004).  The province of Saskatchewan has its own flax industry 
association called the Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission.  The Commissions 
mandate is to develop the flax industry in Saskatchewan.  Its main functions are to 
promote the industry to various industry participants, collect and disseminate information 
relating to all aspects of the industry, and coordinate research and development programs 
                                                
14 Cellulose content is measured because it is an important attribute for pulp and paper milling. 
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(Saskflax, 2005).  The Commission has hired Biolin Research Inc., an organization 
specializing in the development of the flax fibre industry, to promote flax fibre in 
Canada, as well as to undertake research.  Additional public information is available from 
the provincial government of Saskatchewan website regarding the potential of flax fibre, 
as well as information on the proper management of flax straw (SAFRR, 2005a).15  
A new initiative called Flax Canada 2015 has recently been created.  Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Canada, the Flax Council of Canada, the Saskatchewan Flax Development 
Commission and the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta all fund Flax 
Canada 2015.  The initiative has a fibre pillar that focuses on increasing the value added 
of flax straw (Flax Council, 2004).  The overall aim of the initiative is to obtain 
additional farm gate value from flax by establishing linkages between researchers, 
industry, the health care community and government to develop new lines of business for 
higher-value flax based products and processes.  To date, the amount of useful 
information that this initiative has provided industry participants is minimal.       
The growth of flax fibre supply chains has been slow and interrupted in Canada.  
The abundance of low cost flax straw and the range of potential end uses of flax fibre 
have not led to a burgeoning flax fibre industry in Canada.  There have been some 
initiatives in the processing sector but many of these have failed, and interest from the 
manufacturing sector has been nominal.  The U.S. imports approximately US$150 
million worth of flax fibre annually that is used in the manufacturing of textiles, 
nonwoven, and wet-laid nonwoven, composite, and fiberboard products (Foulk et al., 
2002).  Therefore, Canadian exports account for approximately one-fifth of U.S. imports.  
                                                
15The information available on the proper management of oilseed flax straw is not complete, however, as 
the research is still quite preliminary. 
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U.S. researchers have indicated that a flax fibre industry in the U.S. would help expand 
their bio-based economy.  Foulk et al. (2002) also indicated that major technical 
problems associated with establishing a flax fibre industry in the US are the efficiency of 
harvest methods, fibre extraction (retting), and the lack of standards for judging fibre 
quality.   
Background research into the Canadian industry provided some insight into 
factors that may be contributing to the absence of development in the industry.  Some of 
these factors are examined in what follows.                
2.7 Issues Contributing to the Slow Development of the Flax Fibre Industry 
 There appear to be several factors that are contributing to the laconic development 
in the North American flax fibre industry.  Some potential factors that have been 
identified through background research are: lack of a vision, specificity of processing 
equipment and knowledge, paucity of research and development on the properties of flax 
fibre, limited number of processors and manufacturers in the industry, and the absence of 
a recognized quality and grading regime for flax straw and fibre.    
The most relevant aspects of the flax fibre industry as they pertain to industry 
development are explored in the following table, which provides a preliminary insight 
into the potential impact these factors may have on business relationships.  Each factor is 
explored further following the table.  Many of the issues are interrelated and a 
combination of these issues is leading to difficulty in establishing supply chain 
relationships to move the product through the supply chain.  A discussion of each factor 
follows the table. 
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Table 2.1 Flax Fibre Industry Characteristics 
 
  Impact on Transaction Relationship  
Industry 
Characteristics/Issues Producer-Processor Processor-Manufacturer 
Infant Industry 
Lack of information about the potential 
value of flax straw has limited the 
interest of producers in managing their 
oilseed flax straw to increase quality and 
fibre content  
Insufficient evidence about the 
earning potential for processing flax 
straw or utilizing flax fibre in 
manufacturing has limited entry into 
the industry 
Specificity of 
Equipment and 
Knowledge 
Processors must invest significant 
resources in asset specific equipment 
and human capital, which makes an on-
going business relationship important to 
safeguard investments 
Manufacturers must also make asset 
specific investments which means that 
both parties have an incentive to have 
a continuous business relationship 
Absence of Research 
and Development 
Research on correct oilseed flax straw 
management practices to increase fibre 
content fibre quality has been minimal to 
date.  Producers are therefore not 
convinced that straw management will 
increase their returns  
The paucity of information regarding 
flax fibre properties and how flax fibre 
can be used in manufacturing 
industries has limited 
commercialization opportunities for 
processors, limiting the development 
of business relationships with 
manufacturers  
Limited Number of 
Players in the 
Industry 
Producers of oilseed flax do not have 
much information regarding the potential 
value of their flax straw.  They are 
therefore satisfied with the current spot 
market transaction with processors that 
does not provide them with an important 
source of revenue 
The lack of information regarding the 
potential uses of flax fibre has 
constrained entry by processors and 
manufacturers, limiting alternative 
sources of supply and thereby 
increasing exposure to opportunistic 
behaviour and unequal bargaining 
power  
Lack of an Industry-
wide Recognized 
Quality and Grading 
Regime 
Producers are not compensated based on 
the quality of their straw, which limits 
their motivation to manage their straw to 
obtain higher quality straw 
The lack of a recognized quality 
measurement system for fibre means 
the manufacturer must trust that the 
processor is practicing good fibre 
extraction processes.   
  
2.7.1 Infant Industry  
Institutions that produce and disseminate information in the infant flax fibre 
industry are poorly developed.  Therefore, the paucity of information in the industry can 
be attributed to the underdeveloped nature of the economic institutional framework in the 
industry.   It has been indicated that it will take time for processors and producers to learn 
the management techniques needed and, subsequently, make the necessary capital 
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investments to produce more consistent, higher-grade types of fibre (SAFRR, 2004b).  
Producers and processors currently have no, or very little information, about proper straw 
management practices to produce high quality straw.  More information is needed before 
management techniques can be refined to produce high quality fibre.  Flax straw that is 
not managed has generally low fibre content and quality, and can only be used in a low 
value application.  The low quality of straw currently available to processors, in turn, 
limits their possibilities of commercializing the flax fibre into higher value applications.   
The infancy of the industry means there is little confirmation available of success 
in the industry for potential entrants.  Associated with the infancy of the industry, there is 
a limited amount of research and development activity pertaining to flax fibre.  
Therefore, the knowledge about possible end uses and earning potential of flax fibre has, 
to date, been quite small.  There is currently insufficient evidence regarding earning 
potential for investors to become eager about committing their resources.  In essence, the 
paucity of information creates uncertainty for potential supply chain participants and they 
are thus less likely to enter into business relationships in the flax fibre supply chain.   
2.7.2 Specificity of Equipment and Knowledge 
The processing stage of the flax fibre supply chain requires perhaps the greatest 
investment in resources and knowledge.  The seasonality of purchasing straw requires 
knowledgeable and experienced straw buyers.   Processors must ensure that during the 
small window of harvest, enough straw is purchased to keep the mill operating year-
round.  Harvest of the flax crop takes place in the fall and it generally only lasts a couple 
of months.   The short purchasing season for straw means that buying decisions must be 
made quickly and efficiently.  Straw buyers must therefore be knowledgeable of the 
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location of flax acres in their areas, as well as being able to take accurate quantity 
measurements of straw.   The approximate tonnage of straw in a field is determined by 
measuring the length of an average flax plant stalk as well as the number of acres.  In 
addition to the specific knowledge required by processors, the processing equipment is 
also highly specific to flax straw and only suitable for producing flax of a certain quality.  
Well-trained personnel with many years of experience usually operate the processing 
plant.  It becomes apparent that processors would desire on-going business relationships 
to avoid losses on these specific investments.     
2.7.3 Low Levels of Research and Development on the Properties of Flax 
Fibre 
It has been identified that a significant challenge for natural fibre processors is 
that there must be a demand-pull by downstream manufacturers (AAFRD, 2003).  The 
lack of publicly available information about flax fibre properties has likely played a role 
since only a small number of manufacturers use flax fibre in their production process.  
Therefore, the minimal amount of commercialization of flax fibre can be attributed to the 
limited amount of research about the properties of flax fibre and its potential uses in 
industrial products.  Manufacturers are generally accustomed to ISO-certified inputs and 
their hesitancy to use a natural material such as flax fibre is therefore understandable.  
Given that manufacturers are accustomed to using inputs with internationally recognized 
quality standards, they desire a breadth of information about the properties and standards 
of a natural fibre such as flax fibre.  It is presumed that the lack of information 
surrounding flax fibre properties and its performance in different applications plays a role 
in the slow rate of adoption of flax fibre by manufacturers.   
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Thus far, uncertainty regarding the future success of the industry, specificity of 
processing equipment and knowledge, and the limited research on flax fibre properties 
appear to have inhibited investment in the industry.  The limited number of participants 
in the industry is the subject of the next section.   
2.7.4 Limited Number of Players in the Industry 
The limited number of North American processors and manufacturers of flax fibre 
is a concern for the industry.  The small number of processors and manufacturers creates 
what is known as the small numbers bargaining problem.  In Canada, there are currently 
three processors of flax straw operating beyond the pilot scale, which were identified in 
section 2.5 earlier in this chapter.  There are numerous manufacturers that use flax fibre 
in the US, but each Canadian processor currently supplies only one manufacturer on a 
long-term basis.   Background research indicated that the difficulty and costs of 
commercializing flax fibre is limiting the number of different manufacturers in the 
industry.  While flax fibre can be shipped great distances because of its ability to be 
compacted, it is nevertheless more difficult and costly for manufacturers to procure flax 
fibre from sources outside of North America.  Supply chain participants therefore have an 
incentive to establish long-term business relationships.  Close vertically coordinated 
relationships that are long-term in nature safeguard losses from investments if supply of 
raw material would fall away or buyers discontinue purchasing.  Creating stable business 
relationships with single buyers or sellers can, in turn, be costly because of contract 
negotiation and management of the relationship for both parties.  The effect of the small 
numbers bargaining problem on vertical coordination structures in the supply chain of 
flax fibre is explored more fully in the theoretical framework chapter.   
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2.7.5 Absence of a Recognized Quality and Grading Regime 
Industry observers indicated that perhaps the greatest impediment for growth in 
the flax fibre industry is the absence of a recognized quality and grading regime for flax 
fibre.  As a natural fibre, which has natural quality fluctuations, flax fibre would benefit 
considerably from quality grading.  The main functions of quality measurements and 
grading are to facilitate handling and long-distance trade as well as differentiate products 
for buyers (Bockstael, 1987).  Grading in essence provides a basis for determining the 
appropriate value of the product that is moved along the supply chain.  Canadian flax 
fibre is generally sold in large quantities and also travels a great distance to US 
manufacturers.  Therefore, a system of grades and standards is critical in conveying 
valuable information across physical distance about the product to determine the price 
and to define the delivery contract (Giovannuci and Reardon, 2000).  Other natural fibres 
such as cotton and wool are subjected to extensive testing and quality standards that 
provide objective measurements for buyers and sellers to utilize when negotiating 
transactions. 
A quality and grading regime would also make it possible to sort the different 
qualities of fibre according to their potential end use.  Flax fibre is currently not sorted 
according to quality and therefore is generally used in applications that do not need high 
quality or any particular specifications of fibre.  Quality standards would therefore 
complement the research on different uses of flax fibre because it could make sorting the 
fibre to suit different end uses more efficient and effective.    
The absence of quality standards and a grading regime not only makes spot 
market transacting inefficient, it also deprives producers of feedback on quality.  The lack 
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of feedback regarding the quality of their product has limited producers interest in 
managing oilseed flax straw.  Feedback about quality, combined with research about 
good flax straw management practices, could in turn motivate producers to manage 
oilseed flax straw to increase fibre content and quality.  Processors, in particular, would 
benefit from higher quality flax straw that increases processing efficiency as well as 
increases the potential for commercializing the fibre into industries that have higher 
quality requirements.  
2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the flax plant and the developing flax 
fibre industry in Canada.  The industry is still in its infancy, with no producers currently 
managing oilseed flax straw, and few processors and manufacturers processing and 
utilizing flax fibre.  Some issues pertinent to the industry have also been outlined in this 
chapter.  The apparent inability of the Canadian flax fibre industry to grow is 
hypothesized to be partly a result of these issues, and they form the basis of this thesis.  
These issues will be examined with regard to their effect on supply chain coordination.  
The following chapter presents a review of the literature that will be used in the 
development of the framework.  Several themes from the literature are combined in a 
framework to allow for an in-depth exploration of how all of the features of the industry 
affect business relationships.        
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3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter provides an overview of the theories that are included in 
the theoretical framework.  Several bodies of analyses are examined simultaneously to 
provide a comprehensive framework to examine supply chain relationship formation in 
the flax fibre industry.  The theories that are most applicable to the supply chain of flax 
fibre are those that concern the institutional environment, the transaction environment, 
the agency relationship and the relative bargaining power of the participants in the supply 
chain.  Firstly, this chapter provides a brief overview of New Institutional Economics 
(NIE), which was developed to answer questions about the relationships between firms 
and markets that neoclassical economic theory could not answer.  Subsequently, each 
theory comprising the framework is explored individually, highlighting how each theory 
predicts the type of exchange relationship that is most likely to emerge.  This chapter also 
includes a brief overview of applications of the various theories.    
3.2 Introduction to New Institutional Economics 
Neoclassical economic theory did not, and still does not, provide insight into how 
markets are formed.  Neoclassical economic theory includes assumptions about the firm 
and markets that makes it a useful benchmark of economic efficiency, but has limited its 
usefulness in explaining why and how inter-firm relationships form.  The firm is in 
essence viewed as a black box that transforms inputs into outputs (Hobbs and Kerr, 
1999).  The theory of New Institutional Economics was developed as a counterpart to 
neoclassical theory to provide insight into the interaction between firms.  In 1937, Ronald 
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H. Coase authored the seminal article The Nature of the Firm in which he examined the 
boundaries between firms and a market.  Coase explored the idea of positive transaction 
costs to determine why some transactions occur within firms, while others occur across a 
market interface.16  This article would become the foundation of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). 
Positive transaction costs, or the cost of using the market mechanism, is the 
underpinning of NIE (Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990).  The market mechanism is costly 
because information necessary to conduct a transaction is incomplete and it takes 
resources to obtain.     A clear-cut definition of transaction costs is hard to find in the 
literature.  For our purpose, transaction costs are those costs that arise from the 
interaction necessary to exchange a product between two separate stages of production.17   
Coase (1937) argues that when the costs of carrying out the transaction internally are less 
than using the market mechanism, the firm will expand its operation, undertaking 
successive downstream or upstream tasks internally.  Internalizing transactions does not 
eliminate transaction costs, however, and the firm still incurs transaction costs to 
coordinate production between different departments.  In addition, the firm incurs 
managerial costs to oversee all of the production processes and personnel (Coase, 1937).   
When applying NIE, the term governance structure, or a framework within which 
the transaction takes place, is often used as a synonym for the firm (Williamson, 1986a).  
A critical assumption of NIE is that the contractual relationship observed between firms 
                                                
16 There would be no need for firms if all exchanges were costless; in which case, it would be most efficient 
for individuals that have specialized in a part of the production process to exchange with other individuals 
who have also specialized in part of the production process.    
17 The interaction to exchange a product between different stages of production can also be termed the 
transaction, the exchange, or the business relationship, and will be used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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is the most efficient given the costs of using the market mechanism and the costs 
associated with internalizing the transaction (Williamson, 1986a).             
There are many ways exchanges can be shaped.  According to Mighell and Jones 
(1963), there is a continuum of types of exchanges.  They argue that there is always some 
form of vertical coordination taking place between the parties, and that vertical 
coordination increases as the exchange moves from the spot market end to the vertical 
integration end of the continuum.18  Coordination in spot markets is mainly through the 
price mechanism, where buyers and sellers use prices to co-ordinate the exchange.  A 
vertically integrated relationship results when one firm owns more than one stage of 
production and the transaction occurs internally.  In a hierarchy, one party is usually the 
employer of the other party and interdependence between the parties is complete 
(Henderson and Frank, 1998).  Therefore, as the exchange moves along the continuum 
from the spot market end of the spectrum to the hierarchy end of the spectrum, closer 
vertical coordination is observed.  For instance, an exchange relationship that is governed 
by a contract represents closer vertical coordination than a business relationship that is 
governed by a handshake.  Spot market relationships, at one end of the spectrum, are said 
to have weak vertical coordination.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, when one party 
acquires another stage of production, the relationship is said to be most closely 
coordinated.   
The magnitude of transaction costs is only meaningful when it can be compared 
with alternative governance structures or exchange relationships.  The vertical 
coordination strategy that emerges will be that which minimizes the sum of production 
                                                
18 The vertical coordination in spot markets is mainly through the price mechanism.  At the other end of the 
continuum, vertical coordination in a vertically integrated relationship is generally by means of an 
employee-employer contract. 
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and transaction costs (Williamson, 1986a).  Therefore, the efficiency of alternative 
governance structures is only meaningful when they are evaluated either across industries 
in different regions, across somewhat similar industries, or in the same industry over a 
given time period, when transaction costs change.  Following the previous assumption, 
differing transaction costs will result in different types of vertical coordination that 
minimize transaction costs in that region, industry, or time period.         
NIE has replaced the neoclassical theory view of the firm as a black box with a 
microanalytic approach that examines how firms form and make exchanges.  The 
microanalytic approach has evolved into several themes that each examine the exchange 
from a somewhat different perspective. Each of these theories, however, is rooted in the 
reality of costly information and the impact this has on the efficiency of different 
governance structures.  These theories include: Transaction Cost Economics, Agency 
Theory, Market Structure Theory and the Economics of Institutions.  An exploration of 
each theory will follow.   
3.3 Transaction Cost Economics 
 Similar to other theories in NIE, Transaction Cost Economics establishes a causal 
link between the cost of transacting, the most efficient type of transaction, and thus the 
boundary of a firm.  Also similar to the other theories, the exchange is the unit of 
analysis, and the most efficient mode of exchange is the one that minimizes transaction 
costs.  Oliver E. Williamson is a major contributor to the present day understanding of 
TCE by characterizing transactions along three dimensions, as well as incorporating 
several behavioural assumptions.   Williamson characterized transactions according to: (i) 
the level of uncertainty surrounding the transaction; (ii) the frequency with which they 
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occur and; (iii) the degree of asset specificity of the investments that must be made for 
the transaction to take place.  Williamson also included two key behavioural assumptions 
in the analysis of the transaction.  The assumptions that economic agents have the 
tendency to behave opportunistically, as well as their limited capacity to make rational 
decisions, plays a crucial role in making market transactions costly.  Opportunistic 
behaviour is self-interested behaviour that is intended to gain rents at the expense of the 
other economic party.19  Bounded, or limited, rationality stems from the lack of 
information processing capacity of economic agents, which contributes to incomplete 
information in exchanges (North, 1990; Williamson, 1986a).  Given the assumption of 
bounded rationality, parties to an exchange can not be certain about the advent of 
opportunistic behaviour.  Therefore, parties are faced with being potentially exposed to 
opportunistic behaviour when asset specific investments are made during an exchange.  
The assumption of costly information and the behavioural assumptions leads to positive 
transaction costs.  Ceteris parabus, if the lack of information results in prohibitively high 
costs of using the market mechanism, the parties will choose to organize the exchange 
internally.         
Arguably, the most important determinant of what type of contractual relationship 
is most efficient depends on the extent to which asset specific investments characterize 
the exchange.  The degree of asset specificity refers to the value that assets will have 
outside of the contractual relationship.  If these assets are not redeployable in another 
context, or in another contractual relationship, the trading relationship in which they can 
                                                
19 Literature by Barzel (2000) states that the incompleteness of ownership of property rights results in 
transaction costs because of disputes that can arise over determination of prices for instance.  Transaction 
costs are also the result of the uncertainty associated with how the state enforces economic property rights.  
For the purpose of this research the literature by Williamson and his assumption regarding opportunistic 
behaviour is followed. 
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be used takes on real economic value (Williamson, 1986b).  Klein et al. (1978) refer to 
this economic value as a quasi rent that can be sought after by opportunistic agents.  
Therefore, a transaction cost stems from the potential exposure to opportunistic behaviour 
when asset specific investments have been made and ex-post competition is not present.   
The risk of opportunistic behaviour in exchange relationships that arises when 
asset specific investments have created quasi rents is compounded when uncertainty 
characterizes the exchange.  Uncertainty, the second characteristic of the exchange, arises 
due to a lack of information about the industry, the products and other participants.  
Uncertainty in the contractual environment generally prevails in new industries.  
Uncertainty exists because contract terms have to be renegotiated frequently due to 
unanticipated developments (Williamson, 1986a).  There is a risk of exposure to 
opportunistic behaviour every time a renegotiation of the terms of a transaction has to 
take place.  The more uncertain is the transaction environment, and thus renegotiations 
have to take place, the more likely a governance structure will develop to avoid instances 
of opportunistic behaviour.  For example, opportunistic behaviour can be controlled 
through long-term or relational contracts with long-term benefits that outweigh the short-
term benefits of opportunism.  Another alternative is to internalize the exchange and 
create a unified governance structure encompassing the two entities.  The risk of 
opportunistic behaviour disappears to a considerable degree within a firm because the 
parties realize that opportunistic behaviour reduces joint profit maximization 
(Williamson, 1986a).  
Following Williamson, frequency is the third characteristic of a transaction.  Each 
time a transaction takes place a cost is incurred and, therefore, the more often it re-occurs, 
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the higher the transaction cost will be over a given time period.  The cost of transacting 
when assets are not specific is generally low enough that spot market transacting is the 
most economical means of organizing the transaction for any given level of frequency.  
When mixed, or intermediate levels of asset specific investments are made, some type of 
relational contracting through long term contract types will be most efficient, according 
to TCE.   When asset specificity is high, and the transaction occurs frequently, a unified 
governance structure is most economical.  Following the characterization of transactions 
according to Williamson, the table below depicts which type of contracting will be most 
efficient. 
Table 3.1 Transaction Cost Economics Characteristics 
 
Asset Specificity Frequency Uncertainty 
  Occasional Frequent High Low 
Low  
Spot market 
governance 
Spot market 
governance 
Spot market 
governance 
Spot market 
governance 
Mixed 
Neoclassical 
Contracting 
Relational 
Contracting 
Depends on 
frequency 
Spot market 
governance  
High 
Neoclassical 
Contracting 
Unified 
governance 
Unified 
governance 
Relational 
(long-term) 
contracting 
 
Source: Williamson (1986a) 
Williamson (1986a) makes a distinction between relational and neoclassical 
contracting.  Both types of contracting involve asset specific investments, and therefore 
the successful completion of the contract is desired to avoid losses from the non-
salvageable investments.  The main difference between relational and neoclassical 
contracting lies in the use of third party arbitration.  In neoclassical contracting, third 
party arbitration is used in cases when there is a danger that the contractual relationship 
will break down.  In relational contracting, adjustments to the contract are made to create 
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incentives for the successful continuation of the contractual relationship when there is a 
chance of contract breach.  The difference in the benefits of each of the two types of 
contracting lies in the level of frequency with which a transaction takes place when 
mixed asset specific investments have to be made.  When the degree of asset specific 
investments is mixed, and there is high uncertainty in the exchange environment, a 
bilateral governance structure is likely as the frequency increases.  Therefore, when the 
frequency of the transaction is low, standardized spot markets will be more likely 
(Williamson, 1986a).  Evidently, TCE has developed into a detailed analysis of the 
transaction environment.                       
3.3.1 Empirical Applications of Transaction Cost Economics 
To express transaction costs quantitatively is not an easy task.  The measurement 
of transaction costs can be made easier by separating the cost of transacting into three 
categories: (i) information/search costs, (ii) negotiation costs and (iii) 
monitoring/enforcement costs (Hobbs, 1996).  Information and search costs occur ex ante 
to the exchange and include all of the costs involved in setting up the exchange 
relationship.  Examples include the costs associated with finding information on current 
prices, quantity requirements, quality and grade requirements, as well as the costs related 
to finding suitable exchange partners who are able to supply (buy) the quantity specified 
and are generally accountable and trustworthy.  Negotiation costs arise at the time a 
contract is drawn up or an exchange is agreed to.  Negotiation costs can include lawyer 
and brokerage fees, as well as auction commissions that are applicable when the 
exchange is organized through an auction.  Finally, monitoring and enforcement costs 
arise after the exchange has been negotiated and executed.  Examples of monitoring and 
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enforcement costs include quality verification and any legal fees that may have to be paid 
in the case of non-fulfillment of contract terms (Hobbs, 1996).   
The numerical measurement of the transaction costs stemming from asset 
specificity or uncertainty is not simple and second-best proxies must often be used.  
Hobbs (1997) strives to find support for TCE and demonstrates a successful method for 
measuring the importance of transaction costs in the cattle market of the United 
Kingdom.  The empirical evidence indicates that both information and monitoring costs 
are a significant factor in determining which marketing channel is chosen.  Boger (2000) 
performs an empirical test to examine the relationship between asset-specific 
investments, contracts, quality, prices and their impact on the type of marketing channel 
for hogs in Poland.  Key variables are quantified either through ordinal selection, ranking 
or through proxies.  A multinomial logit model is applied by Boger to establish a link 
between the transaction characteristics and the mode of exchange.  The results are not 
entirely supportive of the theory of TCE, which is not unusual of empirical applications 
in this field.  Maher (1997) uses case studies to examine the effects of transaction costs 
on governance structures in several different industries.  The case studies support the 
proposition that characteristics of transactions are a determinant of governance 
structures.20  The case studies highlight the important role that asset specificity plays in 
the exchange relationship, which has been tested in numerous empirical applications.  
Monteverde and Teece (1982) found that backward integration was an efficient response 
to the asset specificity of supplier know-how in the automobile industry, and Masten et 
al. (1989) found that, in the same industry, quasi vertical integration is relied upon to 
                                                
20 The case studies done by Maher also indicated that factors other than those identified in TCE play an 
important role in the efficiency of different exchange relationships.   
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control opportunism and maladaptation stemming from investment in asset specific 
investments.   
In a different study, Hobbs and Young (2000) attempt to find the causes of 
transaction costs.  The impact of product characteristics such as perishability, product 
differentiation and the visibility of quality and regulatory and technological drivers on the 
three transaction characteristics and resulting costs is discussed.  While the work was 
preliminary, they did find exchange relationships could be indirectly explained by the 
effect of changing product characteristics on transaction characteristics.       
3.4 Agency Theory 
 There are many similarities between Agency theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics.  Both theories are rooted in the costliness of information assumption, and 
both characterize the exchange to determine the most efficient mode of exchange.  
Agency theory, however, is primarily concerned with minimizing ex post exchange costs, 
which in TCE are equivalent to monitoring and enforcement costs.  Agency theory has 
developed into two branches.  The unit of analysis, or the dependent variable, in either of 
the branches is the same and it is the contract between the parties (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The main difference between the two branches of Agency theory lies in their approach to 
examining the agency relationship.   
Positive Agency theory is essentially non-mathematical and empirically 
oriented21, while its counterpart, principal-agent theory, has mainly developed 
theoretically but not empirically (Eggertsson, 1990).  Positive agency theory has focused 
on describing governance mechanisms that limit the agents self-serving behaviour 
                                                
21 Positive agency theory is almost exclusively applied to principal-agent relationship between owners and 
managers of large, public corporations.   
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(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Jensen (1983) regards positive Agency theory as a theory that offers 
a more complex view of organizations without making any inferences regarding which 
mode of organization is more efficient.  Principal-agent theory, on the other hand, makes 
specific assumptions and is mathematically demanding, but it provides clear and precise 
conclusion about contractual terms that will be most efficient to maximize the returns of 
the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
For the purpose of this thesis, principal-agent theory (PA theory) will be used 
because of its broader focus and method of characterizing the transaction and insight into 
the efficiency of different vertical coordination strategies.       
Every agency relationship consists of a principal and an agent.  An agency 
relationship arises when the principal delegates some work to an agent and the parties are 
thus involved in a cooperative relationship.  In property rights terms, a principal is the 
individual, or firm, in the contractual relationship who rents out his property rights to an 
agent, which is the other individual or firm, in the contractual relationship, to do the 
delegated work (Eggertsson, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The 
goal of PA theory is to determine the optimal contract between the principal and the 
agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The optimal contract contains appropriate incentives for the 
agent to behave, or create output, in such a way that maximizes the returns to the 
principal.   
Several behavioural and information assumptions are made in PA theory.  
Arguably the most important assumption made in principal agent theory is that 
information is not distributed symmetrically between the principal and the agent and it is 
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costly for the principal to obtain.22  The behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality 
and self-interest are shared with Transaction Cost Economics.  Additional behavioural 
assumptions in PA theory are that the principal and agent have differing risk preferences 
and goals.  These assumptions, however, do not limit the applicability of PA theory to 
many diverse exchange relationships.  Some examples of agency relationships include: 
landlords and tenants, patients and physicians, and voters and elected representatives in a 
democracy (Sauvee, 1998).    
Given the assumptions regarding agent behaviour and costly and asymmetrically 
distributed information, every agency relationship contains a agency problem 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  The agency problem arises because the parties have different goals 
and access to information, leading to the agent not always behaving in the best interest of 
the principal.  The principal must therefore incur measurement costs of either the agents 
behaviour or output to minimize the agency problem.   
The agency problem can be separated into two different problems: the adverse 
selection problem and the moral hazard problem.  Adverse selection arises because 
principals do not have all of the information necessary to select the most apt agent for the 
contract (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Arrow (1963) first introduced the problem of moral hazard.  
Moral hazard arises in agency relationships when the actions of the agent are 
unobservable to the principal, or cannot be logically extrapolated from the outcome 
(Bierman and Fernandez, 1993).   Moral hazard essentially means that there is a tendency 
                                                
22 The principal can incur costs ex ante to entering the relationship by screening potential agents or 
monitoring the output or behaviour of agents once the relationship is established 
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for the agent to shirk on those actions that are unobservable to the principal, which is 
disadvantageous for the principal. 23   
The measurements that the principal undertakes to avoid the two types of agency 
problems will determine the optimal type of agency relationship.  The measurement costs 
that the principal incurs can also be seen as the costs to acquire the information that is 
incomplete to him in the relationship.  The principal has to make a trade-off between 
measuring the behaviour (actions) of the agent, or the outcomes of those actions.  The 
terms of trade, or type of contract, will depend on which measurement will be less costly.  
An outcome based contract is similar to spot market transactions at one end of the 
continuum, where compensation is based on a measurement of the outcome of the agents 
actions, or his output (Eisenhardt, 1989).  If, on the other hand, information about the 
agents behaviour is relatively cheap to obtain, then a behaviour-based type of contract is 
likely to be most efficient.  Behaviour-based contracts roughly correspond to hierarchies, 
which are at the other end of the continuum, where agents are paid salaries for their 
behaviour regardless of the outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989).         
3.4.1 Empirical Applications of Principal Agent Theory   
Empirical validation of the agency problem is not as widespread as that of 
Transaction Cost Economics.  PA theory has been empirically validated using 
questionnaires, secondary sources, laboratory experiments and interviews (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Empirical work has generally focused on the effect that measurement costs of 
agent output versus monitoring costs of agent behaviour play in shaping agency 
relationships.  For instance, Eisenhardt (1985) used PA theory to determine whether 
salary or commission is the optimal compensation scheme in retail stores.  It was found 
                                                
23 The agent has an incentive to shirk because this will bring him closer to his goal of more leisure time. 
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that much of the empirical work of PA theory has been done in conjunction with other 
relevant theories.  Eisenhardt (1985) expanded her earlier work in the retailing sector by 
adding institutional theory predictions and the results supported agency theory 
predictions, that principal agent variables significantly predict compensation in the 
retailing industry.   Anderson (1985) integrated PA theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics to examine the choice of compensation among a sample of electronics firms.  
This study found that high measurement costs associated with the agents actions were 
positively related with using a corporate sales force, or a behaviour-based contract.        
3.5 Market Structure Theory 
 The sources and impacts of bargaining power is an important topic in neoclassical 
economic theory.  However, the literature on the significance of bargaining power on 
exchange relationships is not well developed. Bargaining power is the result of a firm 
having market power, which is commonly measured by its market share relative to other 
firms in the same market (Carlton and Perloff, 2000).  A firm may have market power 
due to barriers to entry or exit, selling a differentiated product, or market power can arise 
naturally (Carlton and Perloff, 2000).  Neoclassical economic theory has often examined 
the effects of bargaining power on prices and the overall welfare impact.  Bargaining 
power however can also influence the efficiency of different business relationships.  
Unequal bargaining power can be used to acquire favourable terms of trade, thereby 
affecting transaction costs and exchange structures.  Thus, the relative bargaining power 
that separate firms have in an exchange is considered to be an important element in the 
structure of the exchange relationship.   
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A firm has market and bargaining power when it does not have to compete with 
other firms in the same market for input suppliers or buyers.  Single buyers are called 
monopsonies and single sellers are known as monopolies.  When a downstream firm has 
market power, it essentially means upstream firms are locked into a relationship with one, 
or only a few buyers.  One instance when a lock-in situation arises is when asset specific 
investments have been made, which limits the number of potential buyers and sellers to 
exchange with.  Williamson first elaborated on the small numbers bargaining problem in 
his TCE literature.  The small numbers bargaining problem, which can arise after asset 
specific investments have been made, exposes parties to opportunistic behaviour.  Klein 
(2005) points out, however, that while asset specific investments may create the small 
numbers bargaining problem, it can also arise from numerous other causes.  For instance, 
market power may result from high barriers to entry and therefore only a few firms have 
incurred the necessary costs to enter the industry.  Thus, the small numbers bargaining 
problem is present ex ante to the exchange relationship.  When a downstream firm has 
market power, upstream firms do not have alternative buyers for their output if they are 
dissatisfied with the exchange.  Therefore, the downstream firm can exercise its 
bargaining power, and most importantly behave opportunistically to gain favourable 
terms of trade, since upstream firms have incurred costs to enter the industry.      
3.5.1 Empirical Applications of Market Structure Theory 
The empirical evidence of the effects of market power on vertical coordination 
strategies is not very extensive.  On one occasion, empirical evidence of the effects of 
market power on the type of governance structure was found somewhat by accident.  
Maher (1997) sought to verify the Williamson transaction cost model by undertaking case 
 43 
 
studies in several different industries.  In her case studies, however, she found that in 
addition to transaction costs, risk of opportunism when a firm has market power is also an 
important determinant of vertical coordination.  Market power considerations were 
observed to affect vertical coordination strategies.  
3.6 Institutions     
Douglas C. North contributed significantly to NIE by developing an institutional 
framework within which to examine transactions.  North (1990) deems that institutions 
influence the costs of exchange and production.  He makes an analogy between 
institutions and the the rules of a game in an exchange to define what an institution is.  
North thereby makes an important distinction between organizations and institutions.  
Organizations, or firms, are analogous to the players that abide by the rules of the game, 
or institutions.  A comprehensive institutional framework is comprised of legal rules, 
organizational forms, enforcement and norms of behaviour.  Political institutions 
incorporate the creation of legal rules as well as the enforcement mechanism.  Economic 
institutions include coordinating organizations, quality and grading regimes.  Social 
institutions can also be viewed as norms of behaviour. The firm is therefore an 
organization that must abide by the rules provided by social, political and economic 
institutions (North, 1990).   
Institutions, in essence, have an indirect influence on the efficiency of alternative 
exchange structures by impacting the comprehensive set of exchange characteristics 
whether they stem from TCE, PA theory or Market Structure theory.  The impact of the 
rules of the game on exchange characteristics becomes obvious when institutions are 
considered as a set of constraints on the behaviour of economic agents.  The constraints 
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that institutions place on human interaction essentially solve human interaction problems 
that arise in a world where specialization has created the need for many cooperative 
exchanges (North, 1991).  To illustrate this it is necessary to refer back to Williamson 
and his behavioural assumption of bounded rationality.  North (1990) contributes to 
Williamsons notion of bounded rationality by stating that one of the reasons economic 
agents are only partially rational is due to their inability to fully decipher the environment 
within which exchange decisions are made.  The framework of institutions, by limiting 
the choice set of behaviours, provides a structure for human interaction during exchanges.  
Institutions therefore, provide a code for exchange that parties can utilize when they do 
not have the capacity to make fully rational decisions about how to coordinate the 
exchange.   
Constraints on behaviour can be divided into formal and informal constraints.  
Informal constraints are the codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions that 
influence how the economic agents interact during the exchange.  For example, a 
handshake between individuals in certain societies can be as consequential as a fully 
contingent and written contract in other societies.  Thus, uncertainty in an exchange can 
be reduced to some extent by referring to codes of conduct that have evolved over time.  
Formal constraints include political, legal, economic rules and contracts that restrict 
human choices and behaviour (North, 1990).   
Legal and political institutions that set and make public rules reduce uncertainty 
in the exchange environment.  For example, the outcome of third party settlement when 
an exchange is not fulfilled entirely by either party is made predictable by a well-
functioning judicial institution.  Economic institutions that perform quality measurements 
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and grade products also support the parties in the exchange by providing a common 
language for value parameters.  The more elaborate and transparent is the institutional 
framework, the less need there is for elaborate exchange structures.  When the costs of 
transacting are reduced through a set of institutions, ceteris paribus, spot market 
transactions will be most efficient.                
3.6.1 Empirical Applications of Institutional Analysis 
The importance of institutions for the organization of transactions is easily 
highlighted in economies in transition from central planning to market based systems.  
Institutions are often lacking in economies in transition because a centrally planned 
economy can also be viewed as a hierarchy.  While still embedded in an institutional 
framework, hierarchies, to a great extent, make use of internal management and 
supervision to ensure cooperative behaviour.  According to Hobbs et al. (1997), at the 
outset of transition, transactions costs in agrifood sectors of former command economies 
were high, which can be attributed to the lack of the appropriate market institutions.   
An analysis of institutions is often conceptual and therefore, empirical evidence is 
generally expressed qualitatively.  An assessment of institutions is generally a component 
of an empirical analysis of another NIE theory.  Boger (2000) investigates how a quality 
and grading institution in a transition economy affects transaction costs.  A quality and 
grading system is shown to be an important economic institution in lowering transaction 
costs.  An analysis of institutions is also included in the work of Hobbs (1997), who 
measures transaction costs in the UK cattle market.  In the UK, a well developed set of 
institutions provide price information which means that this is not a significant factor for 
farmers in choosing a marketing channel.  Thus, due to these institutions, the cost of 
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transacting is reduced and exchange relationships do not have to evolve to counter-act 
high price information costs.  Information on grades through an existing quality and 
grading institution is found to be a significant factor in the producers choice of 
marketing channel, indicating the importance of this type of institution.   
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 The literature under the NIE umbrella has expanded in several different 
directions.  Distinct theories surrounding transaction costs, institutions, agency problems 
and market structure have developed over time.  Each theory explores the business 
relationship from a different viewpoint.   The commonality between the different theories 
is that vertical coordination is the dependent variable.  Each theory essentially focuses on 
a single dimension of the business relationship to predict vertical coordination strategies.  
The following chapter develops the theoretical framework from the bodies of literature 
introduced in this chapter.   
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4.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops the theoretical framework.  The framework incorporates 
concepts of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to provide a comprehensive insight into 
the costs of transacting.  Within the NIE paradigm, the cost of transacting on the market 
is the most important explanatory variable for the shape of exchange relationships.  
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is perhaps the most widely used literature to analyze 
transaction relationships.  There is a growing belief, however, that analyzing the 
transaction from one dimension, namely TCE, is not sufficient to predict the supply chain 
structures.   
For instance, even the founder of transaction cost economics, Ronald H. Coase 
(1998), now acknowledges the importance of including the institutional environment 
when analyzing governance structures.  Other New Institutional economists also argue 
that various theories and concepts need to be combined to build a more solid framework 
for predicting exchange structures.  Eisenhardt (1988) claims that examining a problem 
from multiple perspectives can contribute to robustness in explaining phenomena by 
emphasizing complementary facets of the different theories.  Sykuta and James (2004) 
contribute to this notion by arguing that the future work of NIE should include, among 
other things, an increased integration of theories from a variety of social science 
disciplines.  Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) used several contracting 
theories to analyze management control in inter-firm relationships.  The framework 
presented in this chapter is also an attempt at integrating several bodies of literature to 
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provide insights into supply chain coordination.  Therefore, in this framework the 
different approaches are not tested against each other, instead they are combined in the 
framework to allow for interaction between the variables.  
A brief overview of why a framework is useful in examining supply chain 
relationships is explored first in this chapter.  Next, an in-depth analysis of each theory is 
presented.  Each theory analyses the cost of transacting by examining the transaction 
from a different point of view, and each theory contributes a proposition regarding supply 
chain coordination.   
4.2 Objective of the Framework   
The framework is primarily concerned with the sources of exchange costs and 
how they affect supply chain coordination.  The framework combines different literatures 
to provide a more comprehensive insight into the problem of the slow evolution of the 
flax fibre supply chain.  The value of the framework approach therefore lies in the ability 
to examine a problem through the lens of several different theories, by using many 
variables.  The theories included in the framework are those mentioned in the previous 
chapter: Transaction Cost Economics, Agency theory, Market Structure theory and the 
Economics of Institutions.   
Each of these theories analyzes a different dimension of the transaction.  The 
comprehensive framework analyzes transactions by not only exploring the characteristics 
of the transaction, but also the characteristics of the environment in which the transaction 
takes place, as well as the characteristics of the parties that are involved in the 
transaction.  The following table depicts what insights different strands of the literature 
add to the framework.  The characteristics of the transaction are essentially determined by 
 49 
 
applying Transaction Cost Economics and Agency theory, the relevant facets of the 
transaction environment are determined through an analysis of institutions, and finally 
insights from the characteristics of the transaction parties are determined by applying 
both Agency theory and Market Structure theory. 
Table 4.1 Comprehensive Set of Transaction Characteristics  
 
 Characteristics of the 
transaction 
Characteristics of the 
transaction 
environment 
Characteristics of the 
transaction parties 
~ Degree and type of asset 
specificity required by 
transacting parties 
~ Uncertainty about future 
contingencies 
~ Information asymmetry 
~ Frequency and repetition 
of the transaction 
~ Degree of market risks: 
institutional, 
environmental (rules, 
systems and organizations) 
~ Reputation 
~ Length of the transaction 
period 
 ~ Risk and goal 
preferences 
Features of the 
Transaction 
~ Measurability of 
activities and output 
 ~ Bargaining power 
Relevant 
Concepts  
TCE and Agency 
Theory 
Institutional Analysis Agency Theory and 
Market Structure 
Theory 
 
Source: Adapted from Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000.  
The framework is used to develop several relevant propositions regarding the 
impact of different features of the transaction on vertical coordination.  In addition, the 
interaction between the variables in the framework provides additional insights into 
vertical coordination along a supply chain.  
4.3 Definition of a Framework 
The use of frameworks in economic analysis is not as common as the use of 
models.  Economic models have been popular because of their clear outcomes and in-
depth analysis of a few variables.  Economic models usually include limiting assumptions 
about the environment and have a restricted number of variables.   The number of 
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variables must be restricted, otherwise the models tend to become too complex 
mathematically and the outcome can become ambiguous.  However, the limited number 
of variables leads to a loss of realism in the model, as well as the inability to apply it to 
different situations (Porter, 1991).  Frameworks, on the other hand, require less restrictive 
assumptions than models and they are also more descriptive in nature.  Michael E. Porter 
provides perhaps the most well-known definition of a framework in his 1991 article on 
strategy: 
Frameworks identify the relevant variables and the questions which the 
user must answer in order to develop conclusions tailored to a particular 
industry and company.  In this sense, they can be seen as almost expert 
systems.  The theory embodied in a framework is contained in the choice 
of included variables, the way variables are organized, the interactions 
among the variables, and the way in which alternative patterns of 
variables and company choices affect outcomes. (p. 98)    
 
The framework analyzes the transaction comprehensively by amalgamating 
several different theories.  The framework combines these literatures into a synthesis to 
gain valuable insights into vertical coordination along the flax fibre supply chain.  An 
exploration of each concept included in the framework follows. 
4.4 Insights from Transaction Cost Economics 
The main characteristics of transactions according to the TCE literature are 
discussed below.  Williamson (1986a) identified asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty and frequency as the three most important characteristics of a transaction that 
create positive transaction costs.  Williamson (1986a) also highlights the importance of 
including assumptions about individual behaviour.  Williamson argues that the 
underlying behavioural assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality interact with 
the characteristics of the transaction to generate positive transaction costs. 
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Frequency does not play a large role in this framework.  The frequency of a 
transaction is measured by how often the transaction takes place with the same party over 
a given period of time.  The more often a similar exchange takes place with the same 
party, the more likely the transaction will be governed internally to avoid incurring 
search/information costs, negotiation costs and finally the monitoring and enforcement 
costs to ensure the parties fulfill their obligations in the exchange every time the 
transaction takes place through the market mechanism.  More frequent transactions may, 
on the other hand, lead to spot market transacting because higher levels of trust may be 
developed through repeat transacting.  Therefore, the effect of frequency on vertical 
coordination is somewhat ambiguous.  Given that the background research of the flax 
fibre industry did not indicate that frequency of the transaction plays an important role in 
business relationships, it is omitted from the framework.  The transaction characteristic of 
asset specificity, however, was identified through background research to play an 
important role in shaping business relationships and it is explored in what follows.   
 4.4.1 The Significance of Asset Specificity 
 As outlined in the literature review chapter, asset specificity is arguably the most 
influential transaction characteristic on vertical coordination strategies (Williamson, 
1986b).  An exchange relationship is identified by asset specificity when there is a need 
to make an investment into a production element whose value is diminished outside of 
the relationship.  In other words, the specific identity of the other party becomes 
important and valuable in the transaction.  The bilateral dependency in idiosyncratic 
exchanges24 exposes parties to rent-seeking behaviour because alternative trading 
                                                
24 Idiosyncratic exchanges are where parties have to make asset specific investments such that the specific 
identity of the parties has transaction cost consequences (Williamson, 1986a).  
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partners are no longer available.  The paucity of trading partners after asset specific 
investments have been made is termed the small numbers bargaining problem by 
Williamson.     
Williamson defines opportunistic behaviour as self-interest seeking with guile 
(1986a).25   The main objective of opportunistic behaviour is to extract post contractual 
rent and it can arise when the parties are locked into a bilateral trading relationship 
because of asset specific investments, or contractual gaps necessitate renegotiations of 
terms of trade (Hobbs and Kerr, 1999; Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1986a).  Agents 
behave opportunistically when they trade long-term joint gains for short-term gains that 
are obtained through making false and misleading statements (Williamson, 1986a).  
When there are contractual gaps, parties are exposed to potential opportunistic behaviour 
each time a contractual renegotiation has to take place.  Given the transaction 
characteristics of asset specificity and the behavioural assumption that economic agents 
are likely to behave opportunistically, the following proposition emerges. 
Proposition 1: The presence of asset specific investments exposes the parties to 
opportunistic behaviour, leading to high exchange costs and closer vertical coordination.   
A closely coordinated business relationship is a contractual solution for reducing 
opportunistic behaviour.  When one party completely integrates with another party, it will 
have complete control over the decision making process.   Thereby when contractual 
adaptations are necessary, the costly negotiation process where each party haggles over 
rent is eliminated.  When two parties vertically integrate their goals will be aligned and 
joint maximization of profits will be more economical than pursuing other sub-goals 
                                                
25 It is important to note that opportunistic behaviour is distinctly separate from the neoclassical assumption 
that man is self-interested. 
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during costly haggling.  Similarly, potential opportunistic behaviour is mitigated when 
business relationships are fortified with stipulations regarding arbitration procedures in 
the case of a breach.   
An idiosyncratic exchange can be the result of the need for parties to invest in 
physical capital, human capital, or due to a specific location of a plant.  All three types of 
asset specific investments characterize exchange relationships in the flax fibre supply 
chain.  Fibre extraction equipment is an example of a physical capital investment that 
must be made by processors.  The extraction equipment is only valuable when processors 
are able to source straw and sell their fibre to down-stream manufacturers.  Processors 
make arguably relatively the most asset specific investments in physical capital, making 
them most vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by producers and manufacturers.  To 
successfully incorporate flax fibre in their process, manufacturers must invest in research 
and development.  For instance, research regarding the effect on the final properties of 
the good from incorporating flax fibre must be done.  The manufacturing incorporates 
flax fibre in his process if it is believed that returns will increase either by reducing costs 
or increasing revenues.  Therefore, the investment in research and development creates 
value in having an on-going relationship with a fibre supplier.   
Since both parties to the exchange must make investments that are asset specific, 
these investments can be viewed as hostages that each party to the exchange holds.    
Sporleder (1994) argues that the presence of hostage assets generally lead to closer 
vertical coordination because they increase the opportunity cost of a non-successful 
agreement.  A closely vertically coordinated relationship between processors and 
manufacturers is thus predicted when taking into consideration that the asset specific 
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investments are mutual.  The joint consideration of mutual asset specificity and 
uncertainty follows in the next section. 
 In the producer-processor relationship only the processor is required to make 
asset specific investments.  In addition to asset specific extraction equipment, the 
processors must also invest in a plant location that is site specific.  Therefore, 
relationships with producers in relatively close proximity take on real value because of 
the saving on transportation costs.  Given the asset specificity in the transaction, closer 
vertical coordination would appear likely.         
4.4.2 The Relevance of Uncertainty   
The degree of uncertainty of a transaction can be measured by the number of 
disturbances that require renegotiation of the exchange (Williamson, 1986a).  As noted 
earlier in Chapter 3, every time renegotiation takes place the risk of rent-seeking 
behaviour is a reality and efficient adaptations are replaced with haggling over contract 
terms (Williamson, 1986a).  The following proposition is relevant to contracting in the 
flax fibre supply chain. 
Proposition 2: Uncertainty in an exchange relationship generally leads to closer 
vertical coordination.    
The effect of uncertainty on the exchange relationship is not as straightforward as 
is, for example, asset specificity.  In this framework, uncertainty is assumed to lead to a 
closely coordinated relationship because the uncertainty stems to a great extent from a 
lack of information in the exchange environment.26  Uncertainty leads to gaps in contracts 
                                                
26 Technological uncertainty, as opposed to environmental uncertainty, is likely to lead to weaker vertical 
coordination because a hierarchical relationship with technology uncertainty may not be flexible enough to 
adapt frequently.  A spot market relationship, where there is very little negotiation between the buyer and 
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regarding such factors as price, quality specifications, and quantity.   The contract is thus 
incomplete.  Given the relative incompleteness of the contract, the parties are at risk of 
being exposed to opportunistic behaviour to a greater degree.  To accommodate 
unanticipated future events in the industry, renegotiation of these contractual elements are 
likely to be needed on a frequent basis.  For instance, information about flax fibre 
properties is minimal at this point and therefore, quality specifications of flax straw and 
fibre are uncertain and subject to change as new research is conducted and new 
information is revealed.  To guard against opportunism, parties seek a relationship that 
reduces benefits from opportunistic behaviour.     
It can be argued that when both asset specificity and uncertainty characterize a 
transaction, closer vertical coordination is highly likely.  Douma and Schreuder (1992) 
note this in their discussion of the critical dimensions of contracts.  The authors first 
comment that a long-term contractual relationship, or in other words relatively close 
vertical coordination, results when two parties have mutually high asset specificity.  Both 
parties realize that if either party violates the long-term contract, each of them will be 
hurt.  Douma and Schreuder then remark that when a high degree of uncertainty also 
characterizes the exchange relationship, vertical integration is the most efficient.  Vertical 
integration, which is the closest form of coordination, is most efficient because the level 
of uncertainty makes it difficult to write fully contingent contracts.  Therefore, if 
exchange relationships in the flax fibre supply are characterized both by mutual asset 
specificity and a high degree of uncertainty, close vertical coordination results. 
                                                                                                                                            
seller, may thus be a more efficient governance structure when adaptations are easier when the parties are 
not vertically integrated. 
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The level of uncertainty in transaction relationships is closely related to the 
institutional environment in which the transaction takes place.  The insufficient 
dissemination of information by industry associations contributes to the degree of 
uncertainty in the transaction environment.  Industry associations play a key role in 
providing information on market prices, key trends, issues and events affecting an 
industry.  Industry participants can use all of this information to reduce contractual gaps 
and thereby exchange costs.  The benefit of using a framework to analyze transactions is 
apparent here.  As institutions play an important role in the uncertainty of transacting, it 
is necessary to examine them jointly to gain insight into vertical coordination strategies 
along a supply chain.  The impact of the institutional environment on such elements as 
the degree of uncertainty in exchanges will be examined later in this chapter.   
4.5 Propositions Drawn from Agency Theory 
Agency theory, as with Transaction Cost Economics, is rooted in the notion that 
information is costly.   A crucial assumption in agency theory is the asymmetrical 
distribution of information between the principal and the agent, where the principal does 
not know what the agent has done.  The costs of obtaining information makes it 
impossible for the principal to know exactly what the agent has done.  In agency theory 
the focus is on determining the most efficient contract given several assumptions 
regarding partys attitude towards risk, goal conflict and information (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
As was outlined in further detail in chapter three, agency theory assumes that parties have 
different attitudes towards risk, there is a goal conflict in the relationship and information 
is incomplete and costly to obtain.   
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A principal-agent relationship characterizes most exchanges in a supply chain.  In 
general, the principal will be downstream from the agent and delegates, or sources the 
supply of an input to the agent.  In the flax fibre supply chain, for example, the 
manufacturer sources fibre extraction from a processor, and the processor sources straw 
production from producers.  Therefore, two principal-agent relationships exist in the flax 
fibre supply chain.  Every agency relationship is characterized by the agency problem, 
and this problem is explored below. 
The agency problem arises in principal-agent relationships because of (a) the 
misalignment of goals, and (b) the inability, or high costs, for the principal to determine if 
the agent behaved properly.  There is an obvious misalignment of goals between 
producers and processors in the Canadian flax fibre supply chain.27  In order to maximize 
payoffs of harvesting flax, the producer maximizes the yield of his oilseed because the 
revenue it provides is much higher than the revenue obtained from the straw.  The 
principals payoff is maximized when he receives straw with high fibre content and 
quality because it increases processing efficiency.   
The agent can behave improperly in two ways, leading to the agency problem of 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  Adverse selection is the misrepresentation of ability 
by the agent to gain a contract (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The problem of adverse selection is 
unimportant in the producer-processor agency relationship because background research 
indicated that processors select producers mainly based on their proximity to the plant to 
reduce high transportation costs.  Manufacturers are also faced with making a decision of 
which processor to source fibre from since they have very little information.  The relative 
                                                
27 If goals were completely aligned then the measurement of either behaviours or outcomes would be 
unnecessary because there is no reason for the agent not to behave in the best interest of the principal.  The 
behaviour of the agent would always be his best interest and the best interest of the principal. 
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infancy of the industry means that information regarding abilities and reputation is not 
available, contributing to the problem of adverse selection.             
The majority of information obtained by the principal is to reduce the moral 
hazard problem.  Moral hazard refers to the lack of effort on the part of the agent that is 
unobservable to the principal.  The propositions drawn from agency theory that are 
included in this framework deal with the costs of obtaining information to reduce the 
moral hazard problem.  Eisenhardt (1989) developed ten propositions regarding agency 
contracts, and the propositions included in this framework are based on her work.  Two 
propositions regarding measurement costs and outcome uncertainty were determined to 
be most relevant for this framework.  Firstly, monitoring or measurement costs of flax 
straw and fibre production provide insight into exchange costs and, secondly, outcome 
uncertainty stemming from the fact that flax straw is an agricultural product also provides 
insight into the coordination between parties along a supply chain. 
4.5.1 Measurement versus Monitoring Costs 
To reduce the moral hazard problem in the exchange, the principal can either 
discover the behaviour the agent undertakes to fulfill his obligations and thereby create a 
behaviour-based contract, or he can measure the outcomes of the agents actions and 
create an outcome-based contract.  The principal has to make a trade-off between 
measuring the agents behaviour or the agents output.  The most efficient exchange 
relationship in terms of measurement costs for the principal will prevail (Demski and 
Feltham, 1978; Eisenhardt, 1985).  Nevertheless, some type of measurement still needs to 
take place and this leads to the following proposition.  
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Proposition 3: When outcome measurement costs are high, close coordination 
will likely result. 
Outcome-based contracts are roughly similar to spot market transactions, which 
are at one end of the vertical coordination continuum, while behaviour-based contracts 
are roughly similar to closely coordinated relationships, which are at the other end of the 
continuum.  When outcomes are difficult or costly to measure, outcome-based contracts 
are not likely to prevail.  In this case, obtaining information about the behaviour of 
agents, or monitoring them, is more efficient and behaviour-based contracts prevail.  
Examples of behaviour-based contracts include salaries and hierarchical governance.        
Quality measurement of flax straw must be done quickly during the short 
harvesting season and current technology is not capable of measuring fibre content in a 
short period of time.28  Therefore, since measurement costs are high, outcome-based 
contracts become inefficient and behaviour-based contracts are likely.  Given the 
measurement difficulties associated with assessing straw quality, it is more efficient to 
compensate the producer on elements of his behaviour.  This means that we expect 
processors to compensate producers based on their monitoring of flax straw management 
techniques.  The absence of quality measurements for flax fibre also affects the efficiency 
of outcome-based contracts between processors and manufacturers.  Behaviour-based 
relationships are likely between manufacturers and processors because of the 
prohibitively high cost of measuring fibre output without a standardized procedure for 
measuring fibre quality that is recognized industry-wide.   
                                                
28 Near Infrared technology has been developed by Biolin Rsearch Inc. that can measure fibre content of 
flax straw but it is not able to provide the quality information in a practical amount of time for straw buyers 
who have to make purchase decisions quickly during harvesting season. 
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In the flax fibre industry high measurement costs are directly related to the 
absence of a grading and quality system for both the flax straw and the fibre.  A grading 
and quality regime is an example of an economic institution. The impact of a grading and 
quality institution on measurement costs in business relationships in the flax fibre supply 
chain is examined in detail in Section 4.7.1.       
4.5.2  Outcome Uncertainty 
  In 1985, Eisenhardts empirical research supported outcome uncertainty as a key 
factor in the analysis and selection of either behavior-based or performance-based 
contracts.  Outcome uncertainty generally stems from exogenous forces that affect the 
outcome of the agents actions that are beyond his control.  The interference of 
exogenous factors makes it impossible for the principal to deduce the outcome from 
agent behaviour.  Many agricultural products, including oilseed flax straw, are subject to 
exogenous forces that produce uncontrollable variations in output.   
Outcome uncertainty essentially creates risk in production, which must be borne 
by either the principal or the agent.  Risk stemming from outcome uncertainty in turn 
creates positive transaction costs in exchange relationships.    Allen and Lueck (1993) 
note that outcome uncertainty from weather and other natural forces are the source of 
transaction costs (in agribusiness) and these transaction costs subsequently impact the 
optimal contract design.  The following proposition expresses the impact of outcome 
uncertainty on vertical coordination.     
Proposition 3a: When outcome uncertainty increases, weaker vertical 
coordination is likely. 
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Outcome uncertainty in a principal-agent relationship creates risk that must be 
borne by either the principal or the agent.  An outcome-based contract transfers 
production risk to the agent.  Behaviour-based contracts, on the other hand, transfer 
production risk to principals since they compensate agents based on their behaviour, no 
matter what the outcome.  Therefore, the parties relative attitude towards risk determines 
whether an exchange relationship will be either outcome or behaviour-based when 
outcome uncertainty characterizes the relationship.  
The contractual element of outcome uncertainty plays a large role in business 
relationships in the flax fibre supply chain.  Climatic conditions are a crucial element in 
the success of the retting process leading to a high degree of outcome uncertainty.  Given 
the relatively diverse stream of income from farming, the producer is assumed to be less 
risk averse.  The processor, on the other hand, is required to make a large amount of 
investment in resources, which are only suitable for flax straw processing.  Therefore, the 
processor is likely to be more risk averse and an outcome-based contract that shifts risk to 
the producer is more efficient.      
Since the quality of flax straw determines the quality of fibre, the variability in 
flax straw quality translates into variability of flax fibre quality.  Therefore, the outcome 
uncertainty of the quality of flax fibre is similarly high.  Outcome-based contracts are 
thus also likely to prevail between processors and manufacturers.            
4.6 Insights from Market Structure Theory 
As noted earlier in the chapter in Table 4.1, besides the transaction and the 
environment in which the transaction takes place, the characteristics of transacting parties 
are also an important feature of the transaction.  The impact of market structure is not 
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often applied by New Institutional Economists, but it is considered valuable in this 
framework approach to measuring exchange costs.          
4.6.1 Bargaining Power  
  According to Carlton and Perloff (2000), a firm can gain market, or bargaining 
power at its stage of the supply chain through: the acquisition of special knowledge, the 
government may protect it from the entry of other firms, the market it is in may only be 
large enough for a single firm to produce profitably, or as a result of strategic behaviour.  
Similar to the acquisition of special knowledge, bargaining power can also be gained 
when the other party to the exchange is required to invest in asset specific equipment.  
The acquisition of special equipment in essence increases the costs associated with a 
breakdown in the exchange relationship.  Therefore, the party with relatively less specific 
equipment has greater bargaining power in the relationship since the loss incurred with a 
breach in the exchange is relatively less.   Unequal bargaining power has been an issue in 
agricultural markets for a long time according to Young and Hobbs (2002).  Unequal 
bargaining power makes transacting costly due to unequal rent distribution when 
contractual renegotiations take place.  Considering the infancy of the flax fibre industry, 
contractual renegotiations will be a likely and relatively frequent event.  Therefore, the 
element of bargaining power is included in the framework and its proposed impact on 
business relationships is explored next.  
Proposition 4: Unequal bargaining power leads to high exchange costs and 
closer  vertical coordination.   
The party with relatively less bargaining power suffers a loss in welfare because 
the other party is able to capture post-contractual rents during contractual renegotiations.  
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In other words, the party with relatively more bargaining power can use this power to 
appropriate a larger part of the quasi-surplus in cases when ex-post contractual 
renegotiations take place (Bijman and Hendrikse, 1999).  The steps that are required to 
prevent appropriation of rents creates transaction costs that direct the relationship towards 
closer vertical coordination.  The realization of uneven bargaining power ex ante entering 
the relationship, and the risk of losing post-contractual rents, may cause a hold-up in the 
exchange.  The party with less bargaining power realizes that he may be forced to accept 
worse contractual terms when contractual renegotiations are required.  Close vertical 
coordination is thus a solution when there is underinvestment by the party with relatively 
less bargaining power.  For instance, a monopsonist can invest in the necessary resources, 
or acquire a current supplier.  By vertically integrating backwards the monopsonist 
circumvents the hold-up problem and secures a consistent and stable supply of raw 
material.         
Unequal bargaining power appears to be a factor in the flax fibre supply chain.  
The infancy of the flax fibre industry means that very few manufacturers and processors 
have invested resources to date, leading to a high level of concentration and very little 
competition in those markets.  As a result producers are likely to have relatively the least 
amount of bargaining power in the supply chain.  Therefore, according to the proposition, 
closer vertical coordination is likely between producers and processors.  Competition in 
the manufacturing and processing sectors is absent, giving both parties an amount of 
bargaining power.  Whether either party will exercise his bargaining power depends on 
the potential for each party to gain post-contractual rents as a result of bargaining.         
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4.7  The Importance of the Institutional Environment 
The environment within which a transaction takes place is another important 
aspect determining the efficiency of different methods of vertical coordination.  In this 
framework institutions are viewed as playing an over-arching role in exchange 
relationships, drawing on the literature by Douglas C. North.  Institutions mainly 
determine the environment within which the transaction takes place.  According to North 
(1990) how well institutions solve the problems of coordinating and production is 
determined by the motivation of the players..., the complexity of the environment, and the 
ability of the players to decipher and order the environment (measurement and 
enforcement) pg. 34.  Therefore, assuming the bounded rationality of parties, the 
institutional environment influences, among other things, the degree of uncertainty and 
measurement costs in the exchange.  Including an institutional analysis in the framework 
is crucial in a comprehensive analysis of exchange relationships.           
Institutions can be separated into social, economic and political institutions.  The 
following table lists the different categories of institutions and the type of information 
each of them bring to the exchange. 
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Table 4.2 Categories of Institutions 
 
Institution Type of Information Industry Examples 
Demand, Supply, Price 
Information, General Industry 
Information 
Industry associations that disseminate regular 
information bulletins, have a website with 
information and hand out newsletters 
Value Parameters Grading and quality regime Economic 
Information about flax fibre 
properties and potential end 
uses  
Coordinated research and development performed 
by various different organizations ranging from 
private research labs to federal research stations 
Information about how breaches 
in the contract resolved   
Transparent judicial system and arbitration 
procedures Political 
What legal terms apply to the 
exchange 
Institutions that specialize in setting up legal 
contracts between parties   
Social The trust in an exchange 
relationship 
Observed code of conduct between current 
participants   
 
Given that transaction costs are rooted in the notion that information is costly and 
imperfect, institutions that infuse information in the exchange are an important feature of 
the transaction.  This leads to the following proposition.   
Proposition 5: An underdeveloped institutional framework leads to high exchange 
costs and closer vertical coordination. 
An underdeveloped institutional framework fails to infuse information into the 
exchange environment.  Internal organization of the exchange greatly reduces the need 
for information provided by institutions because of internal communications.   
Examining the impact of the institutional environment is most useful when done 
in conjunction with the transaction characteristics influenced by the institutional 
environment. Therefore, a further analysis of the interaction between the institutional 
environment and its affect on other facets of the exchange is explored in further detail 
next.       
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4.7.1 Economic Institutions and Measurement Costs 
According to table 4.2, economic institutions that reduce information costs 
include industry associations that disseminate market statistics, as well as a grading and 
quality system.  Through coordinated research, industry associations can provide 
information on potential end products and markets, current market prices, and 
information on new technologies.  This information generally reduces contractual gaps 
and uncertainty in the exchange relationship.  Since uncertainty is particularly prevalent 
in infant industries, economic institutions that provide information for parties to an 
exchange play an important role in reducing transaction costs.  The dearth of economic 
institutions in the flax fibre supply chain leads to high information costs to set up 
exchanges, making closer vertical coordination likely.     
The absence of a quality and grading institution is important in the flax fibre 
supply chain.  As indicated from Agency theory, high measurement costs translate into 
high transaction costs.  A recognized, industry-wide quality and grading regime lowers 
the costs of measuring the output of the agents actions, and therefore makes outcome-
based contracts more efficient.  Without a mechanism to measure the outcome of the 
agents actions, the principal must incur costs to obtain information about the agents 
behaviour, or effort.  Thus, in the absence of a grading and quality regime, behaviour-
based contractual arrangements where the principal incurs costs to monitor the behaviour 
of the agent are likely.  A quality and grading system also provides information about 
quality specifications that reduces negotiation costs in transactions by establishing a 
common language to communicate value parameters.  Spot market transactions are 
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difficult and thus costly to negotiate without common terminology about quality 
specifications. 
Research and development (R&D) in flax fibre is another example of an 
institution that provides information.  R&D into the properties of flax fibre and potential 
end uses of flax fibre infuses information into the exchange environment.  Processors can 
use this information to more readily match their flax straw to the requirements of 
different manufacturing industries.  A high degree of uncertainty characterizes the 
transaction between processors and manufacturers due to the unanswered questions 
regarding flax fibre properties.  Information from R&D would reduce contractual gaps 
and thus the degree to which uncertainty leads to costly transacting.       
4.7.2 Political Institutions and Uncertainty 
Political institutions provide information for parties to an exchange regarding how 
contractual breaches will be resolved.  An example of a political institution is the judicial 
system that is in place to deal with breaches in exchange contracts.  According to 
Williamson (1986a), third party arbitration is useful in contracts that are characterized by 
asset specific investments but that do not take place frequently enough to justify 
unification costs.  Costly uncertainty in the exchange is reduced when parties know they 
can rely on a bipartisan arbitration system to solve contractual disputes and uphold the 
exchange.29  When political institutions fail to provide this information to parties to the 
exchange, internal organization is likely because breaches in exchanges can then be 
managed through company policy.  Therefore, exchanges entail weaker, or less formal, 
                                                
29 Note that exchanges still occur when two firms have internalised the exchange.  The exchange merely 
takes place within the unified governance structure between the employer and employees for example. 
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vertical coordination when parties can easily obtain information regarding legal outcomes 
of contract breaches.     
4.7.3 The Social Institution of Trust and Uncertainty 
The social institution of trust is the third category of institution that influences the 
cost of transacting.  Trust can be defined as the belief of either party that the other party 
will not exploit him.  According to (Dyer and Chu, 2003) trust between firms is generally 
based on three related components: reliability, fairness, and goodwill/benevolence.  
Therefore, when trust exists in a relationship, the parties will be less concerned with the 
possibility that the other party will behave opportunistically during contractual 
renegotiations.  A secondary component of trust is the belief in the competence of the 
other party (Ullmann-Margalit, 2002).     
The benefit of incorporating trust in the framework resides in the effect it has on 
the impact of uncertainty in an exchange.  Dyer and Chu (2003) note that trust is 
necessary in relationships where transactors make asset specific investments and where 
there is a high degree of uncertainty.  The higher is the level of trust in an exchange, the 
lower is the risk of opportunism and the resulting transaction costs.  In a transaction 
environment that is characterized by uncertainty, the bounded rationality of economic 
agents to identify whether potential supply chain participants will act opportunistically to 
capture rents created by the asset specific investments increases the transaction costs of 
entering into this relationship (Hobbs and Young, 2000).  Uncertainty surrounding the 
likelihood of opportunistic behaviour is mitigated with a high level of trust (Burchell and 
Wilkinson, 1997).  In the absence of trust in a spot market exchange, tighter vertical 
coordination is a response to eliminate high exchange costs.  Given the infancy of the flax 
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fibre supply chain, a high level of trust generally does not exist, as yet, between new 
participants.       
4.8 Synthesizing the Different Components of the Framework 
Williamson (1986a) indicates in his work on transaction costs that discovering the 
full ramifications for governance requires the simultaneous consideration of asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency.  For instance, uncertainty in an exchange 
environment where asset specific investments are required makes it imperative that an 
efficient method for resolving contractual gaps is in place (Williamson, 1986a).  This 
framework goes beyond the transaction cost literature and includes other dimensions of 
transactions developed from Agency theory, Market Structure theory and the economics 
of institutions.         
The following table provides an overview of the different bodies of literature and 
the proposition(s) regarding vertical coordination from each body of literature.  The 
propositions draw a connection between the feature of the transaction and the extent of 
vertical coordination in an exchange.  Some transaction features have a positive effect on 
vertical coordination, meaning that closer vertical coordination results when this feature 
characterizes the exchange.  The opposite is the case when transaction features have a 
negative effect on vertical coordination.    
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Table 4.3 Summary of the Framework 
 
Characteristics of the 
Transaction 
Characteristics of the 
Transaction 
Effect on Vertical 
Coordination  
Asset Specificity Positive  Transaction Cost 
Economics Uncertainty Positive  
Measurement Costs Positive Agency Theory Outcome Uncertainty Positive 
Market Structure Theory Bargaining Power Positive 
Economic Institutions (industry 
associations, publicly available 
statistical data, grading and 
quality system, R&D Negative 
Political Institutions (judicial and 
legal systems) Negative 
Institutional Analysis 
Social Institutions (trust) Negative 
 
Considered alone, features of the transaction may not provide convincing cases 
for different vertical coordination strategies.  A combination of several factors, however, 
may provide more insight into the extent of exchange costs and their overall impact on 
vertical coordination strategies. 
For instance, uncertainty in the transaction environment, the necessity of asset 
specific investments and the small numbers bargaining problem all characterize business 
relationships between flax fibre processors and manufacturers.  All of these features 
combined lead to high exchange costs and thus solicit a closely vertically coordinated 
relationship.  The weakness of the institutional environment does not appear to offset the 
high exchange costs created by these elements, hence witnessing relationships that are 
closely vertically coordinated becomes likely.       
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4.9 Summary and Conclusions 
The framework developed in this chapter includes several different strands of the 
existing literature.  Examining business relationships with a framework provides a 
comprehensive insight into the costliness of transacting.  The following chapter makes 
use of the different concepts in an in-depth analysis of vertical coordination in the flax 
fibre supply chain, using a comparative case analysis.  
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5.0 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents case studies of the Canadian flax fibre industry and the New 
Zealand wool fibre industry.  The case studies are used to investigate the validity of the 
propositions developed in the theoretical framework.  As highlighted in Chapter two, an 
absolute measurement of transaction costs is not useful.   Therefore, a comparative 
analysis of the transaction characteristics and vertical coordination strategies follows both 
of the case studies.  A comparison is drawn between the different characteristics of the 
transactions taking place in the two different industries to determine the validity of the 
propositions regarding vertical coordination strategies.  Therefore, the main focus of the 
case studies is on the type of business relationships that have formed between industry 
participants at the different stages of production.     
A typical wool fibre supply chain in New Zealand is used for comparison with the 
Canadian flax fibre industry because of several similarities in the product.  Both wool and 
flax fibre are natural fibres that can be used in a range of end products.   Both wool and 
flax fibre are by-products from meat and oilseed flax production, respectively.30  The 
case studies were prepared following background research and interviews with 
participants and industry experts in each of the industries.      
                                                
30 It should be noted that not all flax and wool fibre is a byproduct.  For instance, long line flax fibre is 
harvested specifically for its fibre in countries such as France and Belgium, and Merino sheep are raised 
especially for their wool in New Zealand.  Both long line flax fibre and Merino wool fibre are used in the 
textile manufacturing industry. 
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5.2 The Interview Process 
Given the infancy of the industry, a case study of the Canadian flax fibre industry, 
rather than a quantitative empirical analysis, was appropriate.  To date there are few 
participants in the industry, which means that a quantitative analysis using statistical 
inference based on a survey technique was not feasible.  Moreover, gathering data for the 
case study through semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to gain in-depth 
insights from each participant in the industry regarding their business relationships. 
Several interviews were conducted with Canadian producers, processors and 
industry experts to obtain an insight into the business relationships in the Canadian flax 
fibre industry.  Interviews were also conducted with several individuals involved in the 
New Zealand wool fibre industry.  The case study of the Canadian flax fibre industry is 
arguably more in-depth because the main focus of this thesis is on this industry.  The 
New Zealand case study is only used as a comparison.  Fewer interviews and more 
secondary information was used for the New Zealand case study. Given its established 
nature, more useful secondary information was available about exchange relationships in 
the New Zealand wool fibre industry than in the Canadian flax fibre industry.   
The interviews took place in March and April 2005.  Before the interviews took 
place, the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Committee approved 
the interview process.  Information on the transaction characteristics, the transaction 
environment and the characteristics of the exchange parties were gathered.  In addition, 
the interviews also allowed information to be collected on the structure of business 
relationships between participants in each of the supply chains.      
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Most participants were contacted directly to set up an interview.  All of the 
participants were required by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research 
Ethics Committee to formally consent to the interview.  The interviews were conducted 
either in person or by phone and the researcher took notes during the interviews.31  The 
interviews took approximately one hour.  In accordance with the Behavioural Research 
Ethics rules, the researcher sent notes of the interview to the participant, who had the 
chance to review and suggest any changes to make the notes more accurate.  All of the 
questions were open-ended to gain as much insight into the business relationships as 
possible.  Two different interview guides were developed; one for industry experts and 
one for supply chain participants.  Each semi-structured interview included somewhat 
different questions to reflect the participants expertise, or position in the supply chain.  
The two styles of interview guides are included in appendix A.  Four industry experts, 
two processors and three producers were interviewed for the case study of the Canadian 
flax fibre industry.  One former participant, two current participants and one industry 
expert were interviewed for the New Zealand wool fibre case study.  References are 
made to industry participants in general to preserve the confidentiality of individual 
interviewees.  For example, references to producers of flax straw or processors of flax 
straw are included in the case study.  
General information regarding supply chains of flax fibre is presented next.  First, 
a brief introduction to flax fibre and wool fibre supply chains is presented and the 
different stages of production are described.   A characterization of the transactions in 
each industry according to the framework follows.  An assessment of the propositions 
described in chapter four concludes this chapter. 
                                                
31 All of the interviews with individuals in the New Zealand wool fibre industry were conducted by phone. 
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5.3 Supply Chain of Flax Fibre in Canada 
Producers and processors of flax straw comprise the main stages of production in 
the Canadian flax fibre industry.  Figure 2.1 in the Industry Background chapter depicted 
a typical Canadian flax fibre supply chain.  All of the buyers of Canadian flax fibre are 
located in the United States (US).  All of the flax straw that is available for fibre 
processing is obtained from oilseed flax.  An initial survey of the North American flax 
fibre industry indicated that there were no brokers or middlemen between participants in 
the flax fibre supply chain.  Therefore, only two transactions are taking place in the flax 
fibre supply chain to move the product through the supply chain.  The main stages of 
production in the Canadian flax fibre supply chain are explored below.   
5.4 The Main Stages of Production of the Flax Fibre Supply Chain 
 The main players in the flax fibre supply chain are: producers of oilseed flax, 
processors of flax straw and manufacturers of end products who use flax fibre as one of 
their inputs.  There is a less of a focus on manufacturing, as, at this point, all of the 
manufacturers who use flax fibre are located in the US.  A brief overview of the main 
stages of production is described next. 
5.4.1 Production 
Approximately 1.3 million acres of oilseed flax were harvested in Canada in the 
2004 crop season (AAFRD, 2005).  The majority of flax is harvested in Saskatchewan, 
where one million flax acres were harvested in 2004 (SAFRR, 2005a).  Therefore, most 
of Canadas flax is currently harvested in Saskatchewan: approximately 70% in 
Saskatchewan, 25% in Manitoba and the remaining 5% in Alberta (MAFRI, 2005).  
There are approximately 13,000 to 18,000 producers in Saskatchewan who grow flax in 
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rotation with other crops.  Generally, flax does well after cereals or corn, and wheat is the 
most acceptable crop to follow flax.  Flax is generally viewed as a clean up crop on the 
prairies (Flax Council, 2005).   
As indicated in Chapter 2, the flax plant can be cultivated for two purposes: the 
fibre and the oilseed.  Producers in Canada derive most of their revenue from the oilseed 
and therefore direct the majority of their efforts to achieving a high yielding oilseed crop.  
Seed variety selection, crop management and harvesting techniques are all designed to 
produce the highest yielding oilseed crop.  Flax producers thus do not proactively manage 
their flax straw.  Producers receive minimal compensation for the straw such that there is 
no incentive to manage the straw.  Managed oilseed flax straw, however, can create many 
different possibilities for the potential end uses of the fibre.  As outlined in Chapter 2, 
some different uses of oilseed flax straw include: composite materials, pulp sweetners for 
specialty paper, insulation material and cottonized flax.   To obtain high fibre content and 
high quality fibre from an oilseed variety of flax requires some different production 
decisions and investment in specialized harvesting and retting equipment by the producer 
(Saskflax, 2004).  Factors such as seed variety, seeding date, plant population, plant 
distribution, soil fertility, weed control, harvest techniques and the degree of retting are 
all important elements influencing the fibre content and quality of straw (SAFRR, 2004).  
A diagram of the different processing techniques and end products from managed oilseed 
flax straw can be found in appendix B.     
5.4.2 Processing 
There are currently three commercial processors of flax straw operating in 
Canada.  The largest Canadian processor of flax straw purchases straw from producers in 
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Saskatchewan, Alberta, Manitoba and North Dakota.  This processor is located in 
Manitoba and sells its fibre to a specialty paper manufacturer in the U.S.  Flax straw 
processing is carried out by either of two different processing facilities.  One facility is 
permanent and is located in southern Manitoba, while the other facility is portable and is 
moved between storage yards located in Manitoba.  The demand for higher quality fibre 
necessitated the construction of a permanent facility with more suitable equipment.  The 
future operation of the portable facility is questionable.   
The other two flax straw processors in Canada operate on a smaller scale.  They 
each process their straw in permanent facilities, with one also located in Manitoba and 
the other in Saskatchewan.  One processor supplies a manufacturer who uses the fibre in 
construction material, while the other manufacturer sells the fibre to a facility in the US 
that further processes it for the European specialty paper industry.  One processor 
indicated that economies of scale in processing flax straw is an important factor in the 
success of the facility.  A high throughput of flax straw is needed to recover the high 
expenditure on capital and personnel costs.   
There are several steps to the fibre extraction process.  The process is not highly 
technical in nature but the equipment that is utilized is specifically designed to extract 
flax fibre from flax straw.32  The straw has basically two components: the fibre and the 
shive.  Scutching is the process by which the flax straw is separated into the waste shive 
and the saleable fibre.  The low-end application of the fibre means that further processing 
to clean the fibre from the shive is not necessary.33  
                                                
32 Two processors indicated that their equipment is not heavy enough to handle other fibre crops such as 
hemp and kenaf. 
33 High end use of fibre in linen manufacturing requires thoroughly cleaned fibre that has been through both 
scutching and hackling, which means to comb the fibre to align it more properly.  
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Independent custom balers are hired by processors to bale the straw for a fee.  
Balers deliver the straw to processors storage yards.  At each of the permanent facilities 
in Manitoba, a tractor and trailer unit is used to transport the bales from the stacks to the 
processing facility, or the mill.     First the bales are loaded into a slicing machine in the 
mill, one bale at a time.  After the bales have been sliced, the separation of the shives and 
fibre can take place.  Separating the fibre from the shive is a mechanical process where 
the straw passes through metal rollers to break and the smaller bits of shive are 
collected and later discarded.  The shive is the inner core material of the straw, which is 
not fibrous and makes up 60-70 percent of the straw.34  The shives are collected and put 
into semi-trucks and transported to farms in the area that use it for animal bedding.  At 
the largest processing plant in Manitoba, approximately one semi-truck load of shive is 
produced per hour.  The high amount of shive waste product is a significant cost of 
processing oilseed flax straw because processors have to give the straw away; there is not 
currently a market for it.  
The quality of fibre that a processor supplies to his buyer is to a considerable 
extent dependent upon the quality of the straw he receives.  Essentially, the one quality 
element that the processor has control over is the shive content of the fibre.  The time that 
is spent on separating the fibre from the shive determines the cleanliness of the fibre.  
Most fibre that is exported from Canada has almost 25 percent shive content, which is 
considered high for flax fibre and thus limits its use in high value end products.       
                                                
34 This is the shive content of oilseed flax straw.  The long line variety of flax straw used for linen will have 
significantly lower shive content. 
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5.4.3 Manufacturing 
The potential end uses of flax fibre in the manufacturing sector are influenced by 
the preceding stages of production.  For example, the lack of oilseed flax straw 
management and the relatively low intensity of flax straw processing means the end uses 
of Canadian flax fibre is limited to low-end uses like pulp and paper milling.  The largest 
processors in Canada have equipment that is not readily capable of producing fibre for 
higher quality flax fibre applications. 
Canadian processors currently export all of their flax fibre to the U.S., where it is 
mainly used in specialty pulp and paper milling.35  The flax fibre serves as a 
strengthening agent in the pulp mixture of specialty paper, such as cigarette paper.  The 
number of manufacturers who use Canadian flax fibre are small in number and are in 
long-term relationships with the Canadian flax straw processors.   
A similar introduction to the wool fibre supply chain in New Zealand follows.  
5.5 Supply Chain of Wool Fibre in New Zealand 
New Zealand is the second largest exporter of wool in the world, second only to 
Australia.  The wool industry adds approximately NZ$735 million annually to the New 
Zealand economy.  Sheep were first introduced to New Zealand in the late 1700s for fine 
wool production but it was found that the harsh climate was not very suitable for that 
particular breed of sheep.  The introduction of refrigerated meat shipments in the late  
nineteenth century increased the demand for dual-purpose sheep in New Zealand.  
Therefore, dual-purpose English breeds such as Lincoln and English Leicester became 
popular, as they were highly suited to the New Zealand landscape.  Currently, the most 
                                                
35 A small amount of fibre produced by one of the processors is used in the building construction 
manufacturing sector. 
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common breed of sheep in New Zealand is the Romney, accounting for approximately 
sixty percent of the entire sheep flock (Wool Board, 2005).  The originally English breed 
of sheep has been developed for the New Zealand countryside36 and responds well to 
changing meat requirements.  Romney sheep are therefore a dual-purpose sheep that 
produce strong wool, which is used to make carpets, blankets, heavy clothing and 
furnishings.   
Similar to flax fibre, wool fibre also faces competition from synthetic fibres.  In 
1969/70 New Zealand exported 237,500 tonnes of wool (clean), while for the year ended 
June 2002 it exported only 151,000 tonnes.   For many years wool has lost market share 
to synthetic fibres and this has been the main driver of the declining returns and reduced 
competitiveness of the industry (MAF, 2005a).  To counter the negative effects of lost 
market share, New Zealand has invested heavily in R&D.  This has led to continually 
improving wool product characteristics and functionality and achieved dramatic 
processing efficiency gains, however it has not so far reversed the long-term decline in 
wools competitiveness as a fibre in most applications.   The major constraints on the 
industry include conditions in international textile markets, severe competition from 
synthetics, and production constraints arising from declining sheep numbers. Wool and 
meat are co-products of sheep production and wool volumes are dependent on sheep 
numbers (MAF, 2005a).   
Sheep farmers who raise dual-purpose sheep focus largely on meat production 
because wool is effectively a lower value, though still important, co-product (MAF, 
2005b).  An industry expert indicated that sheep numbers have been in decline as a result 
of the higher returns that cattle brings to farmers which has resulted in farmers switching 
                                                
36 Farmers generally keep breeds that best suit their type of farmland and the weather in their regions.   
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their sheep flock for cattle.  Therefore, the quantity of wool fibre is affected by the 
market conditions of the meat.  Sheep producers, therefore, have to make a trade-off 
between other livestock and dual-purpose sheep.  The type of wool fibre, most often 
measured by the width of the fibre, is largely determined by the breed of sheep a farmer 
selects.  Breed selection, in turn, is largely based on the landscape in the region, as well 
as climatic conditions.      
There are two main types of supply chains for wool in New Zealand.  About 45 
percent of the New Zealand wool clip is sold by means of auction, where wool brokers 
and wool exporters come together to sell and purchase wool for further processing.  
Farmers sell a similar quantity of wool to private merchants, who in turn sell the wool 
directly to wool exporters.  The auction system generally determines the price of wool, 
and private merchants use the auction prices as guidelines when purchasing wool at the 
farmgate.  An industry expert pointed out that selling to private merchants is especially 
popular in times of low prices since the farmer receives cash for the wool at the farmgate, 
providing a greater degree of certainty of returns.  In addition, farmers are developing 
relationships with spinning mills so they can adjust their wool specifications to 
information received about market requirements.  Persistent low prices for wool and an 
increased desire by manufacturers to have an influence on wool fibre characteristics has 
decreased the amount of wool sold through auctions in the last two decades.   
A restructuring of the entire wool industry has taken place in recent years.  
Research and development is increasingly done by privately owned and regulated 
entities.  Since 1984 several New Zealand governments have taken action to create a less 
regulated economy in New Zealand.  Some of these actions to create a more market-
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oriented economy have included floating the New Zealand dollar, privatising or 
corporatising many state-owned industries, progressively removing subsidies and import 
restrictions, de-regulating the labour market, and repaying long-term debt.  As a result, 
the New Zealand government has pushed for the deregulation of many producer boards, 
one of which was the New Zealand Wool Board.  The deregulation of the Wool Board 
and the privatization of R&D in the wool industry appears to be directly related to these 
moves to create a free market.  The restructuring of industry associations in the wool 
fibre industry is discussed in further detail in section 5.8. 
The case study of the wool fibre industry is based on a supply chain that includes 
an auction for selling wool fibre.  All of the people contacted for an interview were most 
familiar with this supply chain governance structure, and most of the literature about the 
wool fibre industry assumes the wool is sold at an auction.  A supply chain diagram of 
wool sold through the auction system is shown below.  
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Figure 5.1 New Zealand Wool Fibre Supply Chain Diagram  
 
  
Source: Canesis, 2002 
5.6 The Main Stages of Production in the Wool Fibre Supply Chain 
The wool supply chain in New Zealand is arguably quite long, especially in 
comparison to the Canadian flax fibre supply chain.  Beyond the farmgate, the main 
sellers of wool are wool brokers and the main buyers of wool are wool exporters who buy 
the wool for mills abroad.  The test house, auction, wool scour and shipping stages of the 
supply chain play facilitating roles in the supply chain, but do not actually move the 
product through the supply chain.  Interestingly, the woolgrower owns the wool until it is 
bought by the wool exporter, as the wool broker does not actually buy the wool to supply 
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to the auction.   Wool brokers, however, play a crucial role in moving the wool through 
the supply chain by collecting wool from woolgrowers and organizing weekly auctions.  
Wool scourers are generally consigned by wool exporters to clean the wool and do not 
take ownership of the wool.  Therefore, the main transactions taking place to move the 
wool are between woolgrowers and wool brokers, between wool brokers and wool 
exporters by means of the auction, and between wool exporters and spinners of wool.  
The yarn is then sold to different manufacturers.   Following is a brief description of the 
role of the main supply chain players. 
5.6.1 Woolgrower 
Around 44 million sheep make up the flock in New Zealand, which means that 
sheep outnumber people eleven to one.  An average woolgrower has a flock of 2,500 
ewes that he keeps along with some stock rams and a herd of cattle.  A large sheep farm 
has between 6,000 and 10,000 sheep.  A typical ewe produces about 5.4 kilograms of 
wool per shearing, and most cross-breds are shorn twice per year (Wool Board, 2005).  
During shearing season the farmer hires a shearing gang and a wool classer to shear his 
sheep and classify the wool before it is sold to a wool broker.  Wool classers initially 
classify the wool based on visual inspections during shearing and sort the different 
qualities of wool.  Wool classers essentially set up the classification of wool for the rest 
of the supply chain, since they arrange the bales based on their classifications.  A bale of 
wool leaving the farm weighs approximately 150kg.  Most woolgrowers will ensure that 
they have at least enough sheep to bring one lot of wool to the auction.  Wool exporters 
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generally buy wool in lots at auctions and prefer to buy lots that come from a single farm 
and have not been combined.37   
5.6.2 Wool Broker 
Wool brokers essentially act as agents for woolgrowers and sell wool on their 
behalf.  In an industry associations online directory, eight wool brokering firms were 
found, and a number of them have field representatives that source wool from the main 
wool producing regions in New Zealand (Meat and Wool, 2005).  Representatives 
arrange agreements with woolgrowers to broker their wool and organize the 
transportation of the wool from the farm to an aggregation centre.  At an aggregation 
centre two different samples of wool are taken from each bale.  A core sample is taken 
from each bale that is sent to the testing facility and a grab sample38 is taken from each 
bale that will be displayed at the auction.  The wool broker also weighs the bales and has 
adequate storage facilities to store the bales both before and after the auction takes place.  
The wool broker prepares a catalogue for every auction that, amongst other things, 
contains the information from the test certificate of the wool.  After the auction takes 
place, wool brokers must organize the shipment of their wool to the scouring facility if it 
is to be scoured in New Zealand, or otherwise ship it directly to the shipping terminal.39  
The woolgrower must pay a standard fee to the wool broker for his services, and it is 
subtracted from the sale price of his wool. 
The role of the wool broker goes far beyond merely selling wool on behalf of the 
woolgrower.  Most wool brokers stockbrokers sell merchandise for raising sheep to 
                                                
37 In some cases spinning mills specify which farms they prefer the wool exporter to buy wool from and a 
combined lot is therefore not useful to the wool exporter. 
38 A grab sample is a term that indicates the sample is intended for display at auction as opposed to the core 
sample that is intended for the testing. 
39 There are 17 scouring plants in New Zealand. 
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woolgrowers.  Wool brokers can also help with financing the woolgrowers operation.  
Perhaps most interestingly, the wool broker provides woolgrowers with information 
concerning wool production.  Representatives of the wool broker provide guidance on 
which sheep to breed as well as proper ram selection to optimize wool quality. 
5.6.3 Wool Exporter 
There are approximately 100 wool exporters in New Zealand that work on behalf 
of spinning mills.  Approximately 20 percent of wool exporters handle 90 percent of 
wool exports (MAF, 2005b).  A wool exporter generally first negotiates a contract with a 
mill to supply the mill with a consignment of wool at a future date.  The wool exporter 
then attends the auction and purchases wool that meets the quality specifications 
indicated by the mill.  After the wool exporter purchases wool at an auction, he gives the 
broker instructions on how to deliver the wool.  Most often the wool that exporters 
purchase is blended at scouring facilities in New Zealand into a uniform quality grade to 
satisfy the spinning mills requirements.  Brokers consign the wool to a scouring 
company after the sale.  All of the wool that is used for spinning needs to be scoured.40   
Wool scouring is the process of washing wool in hot water to remove the non-wool 
contaminants and then drying it.  At the scouring facility the wool is densely baled to 
minimize transportation costs to spinning mills abroad.    
5.6.4 Spinning Mill 
The majority of New Zealand wool is exported to spinning mills abroad, similar 
to the export of flax fibre to manufacturers in the US.  For the past seven years, the 
largest export markets have been China including Hong Kong.  The most common end 
                                                
40 Most of the wool is scoured in New Zealand before it is shipped abroad.  However, countries such as 
China are developing their own scouring facilities that can scour the wool at a lower cost than New Zealand 
facilities. 
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use of wool is for machine-made carpets.  Over 30 percent of New Zealand wool is used 
for this purpose (Wool Board, 2005).  Spinning is a capital-intensive operation that 
involves creation of yarns suitable for weaving, tufting or knitting processes, which turn 
yarn into end products.  An industry expert noted that transportation costs do not deter 
spinning mills from shipping their yarn to manufacturers across the world.  Spinning 
mills that are located in low labour cost countries that have a cost advantage and the 
declining margins in the industry are forcing some spinning mills in Western countries 
out of business. 
The testing of wool in New Zealand follows internationally recognized standards.  
The following section takes a more in-depth look at the attributes of wool that are tested 
at the testing facilities.     
5.7 Wool Testing 
Wool testing in New Zealand is highly specialized and produces objective quality 
measurements useful in valuing wool fibres.  Wool tests are performed according to the 
procedures specified by the International Wool Textile Organization (IWTO).  The 
IWTO is an international body representing the interests of the worlds wool-textile trade 
and industry41.  One of its objectives is to oversee the development and correct 
application of scientific test methods and regulations among its membership.  All of the 
wool produced in New Zealand is tested according to these procedures.  There are two 
independent testing facilities in New Zealand.  The New Zealand Wool Testing Authority 
                                                
41 The IWTO head office is located in Brussels, Belgium.  It was created in 1927 when representative 
bodies of the wool-textile industries in Britain and France signed an arbitration agreement for solving 
disputes.  Membership is restricted to representative national associations of the wool-textile trade and 
industry, which means that membership is on a national basis.  Currently the IWTO has 26 member 
countries.  The IWTO has several committees that all report to the Assembly which ratifies all of the 
decisions made by the committees.  The IWTO seeks funding from member countries for several of its 
research and marketing activities. 
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and the SGS Wool Testing Services Ltd. both offer identical testing services.  The 
Australian Wool Testing Authority Ltd owns 50 percent of the New Zealand Wool 
Testing Authority and Wool Equities Ltd owns the other 50 percent.  SGS Wool Testing 
Services Ltd. is a sister company to Wool Testing Services International, based in 
Bradford, England, which provides similar services to clients throughout Europe, Central 
Asia, and South America.  
The two testing facilities charge approximately the same price for testing a lot of 
wool, about NZD$60.  While wool can be tested both before the auction and after the 
scouring process, approximately 80 percent of all the wool is tested before the auction 
(Canesis, 2002).  When the wool is tested presale, the wool broker subtracts the testing 
costs from the wool growers payout.  When the testing takes place post sale, the wool 
exporter pays for the testing of the wool.   
The pre-sale test assesses the following quality parameters of the wool: wool yield 
or wool base, fibre diameter or micron, and colour.  Before testing begins, all of the core 
samples from a lot are blended to ensure the tests are representative of the entire lot.  
Wool yield is the weight of clean wool, after impurities have been removed in a 
specialized cleaning process.  The most common impurity is vegetable matter and it is 
generally listed on the test certificate since it increases the loss of wool fibre during 
processing.  Essentially, the wool yield gives an accurate indication of the quantity of 
usable wool but does not provide any information about the potential uses of the wool.  
The fibre diameter is arguably the most important quality parameter because it 
determines how the fibre will be used.  The fibre diameter of wool is expressed in terms 
of microns, which is one millionth of a metre.   New Zealand cross-bred wool generally 
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has a 31 micron42 or greater.  In most cases the price of wool increases as the micron 
decreases.  Finally, the colour of the wool fibre is determined at the testing facility.  The 
colour measurement will assist the manufacturer with the potential for dying the wool.43  
When the manufacturer intends to dye the wool a light pastel colour, the wool must be 
very white and bright (NZWTA, 2005).  The information that wool testing provides 
participants in the supply chain with is crucial in valuing the wool. 
5.8 Industry Associations 
The breadth of industry associations that support the wool fibre industry also sets 
the industry apart from the Canadian flax fibre industry.  As mentioned in section 5.5, a 
large restructuring of various industry associations has taken place in recent years.  
Previously the New Zealand Wool Board had the main functions of, collecting levies, 
organizing industry research and development (R&D), and promoting New Zealand 
wool.  The Wool Board was entirely funded by woolgrowers who contributed five 
percent of annual wool sales.   In June McKinsey 2000 & Company completed a report 
for the wool industry that recommended the dissolution of the Wool Board and the 
establishment of new industry-good44 structures for the wool industry (McKinsey and 
Company, 2000). In August 2000, 91 percent of grower respondents in a poll supported 
these recommendations. Since then, new commercial industry-good structures have 
emerged and are replacing the current New Zealand Wool Board (MAF, 2005c). The 
Wool Board operations have been taken over by the newly formed Wool Equities Ltd. 
                                                
42 A micron is one millionth of a meter.  The average of a fine fleece of wool is approximately 14-15 
micron and this type of wool is used in luxury garments and baby clothes.  Fibre with a micron of 23-26 is 
used for knitting of most type of garments 
43 Dying is an additive process and it is therefore impossible to dye the wool lighter than its original colour. 
44 Industry-good structures do functions that benefit the industry.  Therefore, research and development, 
technology transfer, education, and training are all functions of an industry-good structure.  It is essentially 
an industry association that further develops the industry. 
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(WEL), and the Merino Grower Investments Ltd in 2004.  WEL is a farmer-owned 
investment company that specializes in the wool, sheep and primary industry sectors and 
in wool research and development (WEL, 2005).  WEL partially owns several research 
organizations that conduct research in areas from carpet making technology 
commercialization (Ovita) to organizations that collect and disseminate market 
information on wool export prices and volumes and wool types (Tectra).  A levy of two 
percent is currently collected by Meat and Wool New Zealand45 that is used to fund 
industry good research.  Meat and Wool New Zealand collected NZD$32.5 million in 
wool levies and received approximately NZD$99 million in cash and resources from 
government, industry, and offshore collaborations.  The two percent levy is 
approximately six cents per kilogram of wool (Meat and Wool, 2003).  
The International Wool Textile Organization (IWTO) has developed, and keeps 
up to date, The Blue book.  Every member country of the IWTO must adhere to the 
principles of arbitration outlined in the book.  The Blue book represents the basis for the 
conditions under which most of the world wool trade conducts its business. The rules 
contained in it are agreed between the numerous players in the wool-textile trade and 
industry.  The Blue book also contains the International Wool Textile Arbitration 
Agreement that provides information for the resolution of disputes arising between 
partners from different countries. Arbitrators from the industry use the procedures 
outlined in the Agreement to ensure a fair and efficient settlement.  The Blue book is 
available to any individual for a small fee, approximately CAN$ 80 (IWTO, 2005) 
                                                
45 Meat & Wool New Zealand is funded by livestock producers through a levy on all beef, sheep and goats 
slaughtered in New Zealand.   Its role is to help in the attainment, in the interests of livestock farmers, of 
the best possible net ongoing returns for New Zealand livestock (which include sheep, cattle and goats), 
meat products and co-products. 
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 R&D activities by the IWTO, WEL and other industry associations play a key 
role in new market development for New Zealands wool fibre.  In addition to providing 
woolgrowers, spinning mills and carpet manufacturers with technical information 
regarding wool, these industry associations also provide a breadth of market information 
to participants that is reduces information search costs when drawing up agreements. 
5.9 Transactions in Each of the Industries  
The remainder of the chapter is an analysis of the propositions that were 
developed in the theoretical framework in the preceding chapter.  The transactions in 
each of the industry have been characterized following Transaction Cost Economics, 
Principal Agent theory, Market Structure theory and the economics of Institutions.  A 
comparison of both the transaction characteristics and the type of relationship between 
parties46 in each of the industries is undertaken to examine the validity of the 
propositions.    
5.9.1 Transactions in the Flax Fibre Supply Chain 
The following table lists the characteristics of transactions in the Canadian flax 
fibre industry that were identified through the interviews.  The table, in essence, 
summarizes the responses from the interviews.  The following table is used for the 
analysis of the propositions done in section 5.12 of this chapter.    
                                                
46 Only those relationships between participants who market the product through the supply chain are 
analysed.  Therefore, relationships with transportation companies for example, are not examined since they 
play a facilitating role in the supply chain and do not actually market the product. 
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5.9.2 Transactions in the Wool Fibre Supply Chain 
Similar to the characterization of the transactions of the Canadian flax fibre 
industry, the New Zealand wool fibre industry transactions have been characterized.  The 
characterization of transactions is undertaken according to the concepts included in the 
framework.  The following table summarizes the responses from the interviews, as well 
as secondary information.   The following table is also used for the analysis of the 
propositions in section 5.12 of this chapter. 
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5.10 Analysis of the Propositions 
The following table compares the transactions in the two different supply chains.  
Each feature of the transaction that was explored in the framework is included in the 
table.  Each dimension of the transaction and the corresponding proposition will be 
explored more in-depth following the table. 
Table 5.4 Comparison of Transaction Features   
 
  
Canadian Flax Fibre 
Supply Chain 
Relationships 
New Zealand Wool Fibre Supply Chain 
Relationships 
 
Producer-
Processor 
Processor-
Manufacturer 
Woolgrower-
Wool Broker
Wool Broker-
Wool 
Exporter 
Wool Exporter-
Spinning 
Mill/Manufacturer
Transaction Cost 
Economics   
Asset Specificity idiosyncratic52 idiosyncratic mixed53 mixed mixed 
Uncertainty high high low low low 
Market Structure Theory   
Bargaining Power none equal none none unequal54 
Agency Theory           
Measurement/Monitoring 
Costs high high low low low 
Outcome Uncertainty high high low low low 
Institutional Analysis   
(Economic) Industry 
Associations 
none specifically for flax straw 
or flax fibre 
a wide range of industry associations that provide 
market information available to all supply chain 
participants   
(Economic) Quality and 
Grading Regime 
 
none well-recognized 
(Economic) R&D Initiatives few and low-budget  
widespread and range from technical to market 
related research  
(Political) Judicial and 
Arbitration Procedures none 
standardized contractual arrangements and 
transparent arbitration procedures55 
(Social) Trust 
plays an important role in 
exchange relationships 
does not play an important role in exchange 
relationships 
                                                
52 Idiosyncratic investments have little or no value outside of the business relationship.  
53 Mixed investments are somewhere in between the two extremes of investments: non-specific which can 
be applied in many different relationships and idiosyncratic which are not redeployable outside of the 
transaction it was intended for. 
54 The manufacturer, who is closer to the end consumer generally has the most bargaining power.  
However, the state of the wool fibre economy, whether it is in decline or not, also determines who has the 
greatest bargaining power in the business relationship. 
55 Due to the long history of the wool trade in New Zealand and the involvement of the IWTO, exchange 
agreements have become standardized over the years.  
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Evidently there are numerous differences in the transaction, transaction 
environment and characteristics of the transaction parties between the two industries.  To 
examine the propositions, the different vertical coordination structures between the two 
supply chains are also compared, as shown in Table 5.4.     
Table 5.5 Comparison of Business Relationships in the Canadian Flax Fibre Supply 
Chain and the New Zealand Wool Fibre Supply Chain 
 
Canadian Flax Fibre Supply 
Chain Relationships 
New Zealand Wool Fibre Supply Chain 
Relationships 
Producer-Processor 
Processor-
Manufacturer 
Woolgrower-
Wool Broker 
Wool Broker-
Wool Exporter 
Wool Exporter-
Spinning 
Mill/Manufacturer 
(generally recurring)  
Spot Market 
Relationship56 
(long-term) 
Contractual 
Relationship or Full 
Integration 
(generally 
recurring) Spot 
Market 
Relationship57 
Spot Market 
Relationship at 
Auction 
Contractual 
Relationship 
 
 A spot market relationship is observed between producers and processors of flax 
straw.  Straw buyers who work for the processors generally approach producers of 
oilseed flax during the cropping season.  The same producers are usually approached year 
after year, as long as they keep their fields relatively clean of contamination material.  A 
spot market relationship also exists between woolgrowers and wool brokers in the New 
Zealand wool fibre supply chain.  The woolgrower generally sells to the same wool 
broker during every shearing season.  Therefore, the exchange is generally recurring and 
a long-term relationship is fostered between woolgrowers and wool brokers. Wool 
brokers provide woolgrowers with production information to increase the yield and value 
of their wool, which most likely helps to cultivate these long-term relationships.  
                                                
56 Every harvest season the processor approaches producers of oilseed flax who are in the area and their 
fields appear to be in good condition after a short visual inspection by straw buyers.  Often the same 
producers are contacted year after year. 
57 During shearing season wool brokers vie for the wool from woolgrowers.  Generally woolgrowers sell 
their wool to the same wool brokers but there are no promises for future arrangements made. 
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Therefore, even though both exchanges occur on the spot market, the relationship 
between woolgrowers and wool brokers is considered closer because of the greater 
information sharing by the wool broker.   
There are no brokers presently purchasing Canadian produced flax fibre and, 
therefore, transactions are taking place directly between processors and manufacturers.  
Processors and manufacturers in the downstream flax fibre supply chain are in a long-
term contractual relationship, or fully integrated in the case of one processor.  Each of the 
Canadian processors sell all of their fibre to one manufacturer and therefore tailor their 
entire production line to one manufacturer.  In New Zealand, wool brokers play an 
integral part in moving the wool through the supply chain.  Wool brokers organize 
auctions where wool exporters purchase the wool on contract for a spinning mill.  
Independent wool exporters generally have contractual relationships with spinning mills 
in the downstream New Zealand wool fibre industry.  The wool exporter enters into a 
contract in which he agrees to deliver a certain quantity and quality of wool at a specified 
price and time.   
 Given the information on the comprehensive characteristics of the transactions 
and the observed vertical coordination strategies in the two supply chains, a verification 
of the propositions follows. 
5.10.1 Asset Specificity 
Specific investments are not required by oilseed flax producers to sell their straw 
to processors.  Processors of flax straw on the other hand do require specialized fibre 
extraction equipment, as well as knowledgeable personnel to operate and maintain the 
equipment.  Canadian processors have invested in fibre extraction equipment that is 
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capable of producing fibre quality that can only be utilized in low-value applications.  
The cleanliness of the fibre is not very high and is therefore not suitable for higher value 
applications.  Therefore, the processing equipment that Canadian processors own limits 
the type of applications of the fibre, and thus the number of buyers.  Given the already 
limited number of players in the manufacturing sector, processors are essentially locking 
themselves into a bilateral exchange relationship with a certain type of manufacturer 
when they invest in processing equipment.  Therefore, both the structure of the market 
and the nature of the processing equipment exposes processors to potential opportunistic 
behaviour when they enter the flax fibre supply chain.  Manufacturers similarly have to 
make asset specific investments because they have to invest resources in the R&D 
necessary to incorporate flax fibre into their process.  The asset specific nature of this 
R&D exposes the manufacturer to potential opportunistic behaviour.       
  New Zealand woolgrowers, for the most part, produce a grade of wool fibre that 
is used for heavier applications such as carpet and upholstery manufacturing.  Sheep 
producers in New Zealand do not have to make asset specific investments to enter into an 
agreement with any of the wool brokers.  Wool brokers require some specialized 
equipment at their aggregation centres to take core and grab samples, as well as weigh the 
bales.  Spinning mills make perhaps the largest investment in equipment of all the other 
participants in the supply chain.  The spinning equipment can handle different qualities of 
wool fibre, but is not suitable for spinning other natural fibres, such as cotton for 
example.  Seemingly none of the investments lock participants into bilateral exchange 
relationships but the equipment can not be easily used for a purpose unrelated to wool 
production.  The investments made by participants in the wool fibre supply chain have 
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thus been characterized as mixed.    The proposition developed in the theoretical 
framework stated the following regarding asset specific investments:       
Proposition 1: The presence of asset specific investments exposes the parties to 
opportunistic behaviour, leading to high exchange costs and closer vertical coordination.  
The case studies indicated that the degree of asset specific investments is greater 
in the downstream flax fibre supply chain.  Therefore, it was expected that closer vertical 
coordination to limit opportunistic behaviour would be observed.  This is indeed the case 
in the flax fibre supply chain.  The exchange relationship between processors and 
manufacturers is close to, and in one case, at the hierarchical end of the spectrum.  This is 
the most efficient means of coordinating the business relationship given the mutual asset 
specificity or hostage assets that are present in the relationship.  The presence of hostage 
assets diminishes the joint maximization in the event of a breach in the relationship.   
A spot market relationship, as opposed to closer vertical coordination, is observed 
between producers and processors.  The irrelevance of the proposition in this relationship 
can be explained by two realities in the flax fibre industry.  Firstly, there is an abundance 
of raw material on the prairies and secondly, producers have a great desire for processors 
to organize baling and transportation of the straw so it does not have to be burned.  
Therefore, the processor does not have to safeguard secure sources of this raw material 
and thereby does not need to set up on-going business relationships with producers.  
In the New Zealand wool fibre supply chain asset specificity does not lock   
woolgrowers, wool brokers and wool exporters into bilateral relationships.  None of the 
investments were found to be relationship-specific, only industry-specific.  The fact that 
there are many players at each stage of the supply chain means that any investments 
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(knowledge or equipment) that are necessary to enter the industry are not at risk of 
becoming a sunk cost because alternative exchange partners could not be found.  Ex post 
competition at each stage of the supply chain reduces the risk of opportunism in each of 
the business relationships. Less formal vertical coordination is likely to characterize these 
relationships.  This is indeed observed, as spot market transaction relationships are 
generally the norm.  Spinning mills make perhaps the greatest degree of asset specific 
investments because of high spinning equipment costs and limited alternative uses of the 
spinning equipment.  The need for a specific quality of wool fibre means that written 
contracts are formed between spinning mills and wool exporters.  These written contracts 
make use of the objective quality measurements to specify requirements.  The second 
concept of the transaction cost literature is uncertainty and it is examined below. 
5.10.2 Uncertainty 
Apparent from the framework, the level of uncertainty in the transaction 
environment is closely related to the degree to which institutions provide information to 
the parties to the exchange.  The infancy of the flax fibre industry and thus the lack of 
information about its future creates a transaction environment with high uncertainty at all 
of the stages of the supply chain.  The New Zealand wool fibre industry, on the other 
hand, is characterized by a low level of uncertainty and contractual gaps are not common-
place in this well-developed industry.  According to the following proposition, closer 
vertical coordination in Canadian flax fibre supply chain is to be expected than in wool 
fibre supply chains in New Zealand. 
Proposition 2: Uncertainty in an exchange relationship generally leads to closer 
vertical coordination. 
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According to the proposition, parties will fortify their relationships to avoid costly 
haggling over post-contractual rents in exchange agreements that have gaps stemming 
from uncertainty.  The close vertical coordination observed between processors and 
manufacturers in the flax fibre supply chain can be attributed to the contractual gaps 
stemming from a lack of information regarding a fair price and quality specifications of 
the fibre.   Contractual gaps in the New Zealand wool fibre industry are not common-
place because of the low level of uncertainty in the transaction environment.  Market 
prices are easily determined through the market mechanism and information regarding 
the appropriate quality specifications needed by spinning mills is readily available.  R&D 
initiatives have provided spinning mills with information on carpet manufacturing and 
accredited testing facilities provide a breadth of information on wool fibre quality 
specifications.   The low level of uncertainty in exchange relationships does not 
contribute to high exchange costs and thus close vertical coordination is not required.    
5.10.3 Measurement versus Monitoring Costs    
Transactions in the flax fibre supply chain are characterized by high measurement 
costs because of the absence of quality measurement and grading of flax straw and fibre.  
Quality measurement of wool fibre in New Zealand, on the other hand, is highly technical 
and produces third party objective quality measurements that are relied upon in exchange 
relationships to value the wool fibre.  Therefore, measurement costs of outcomes in 
principal-agent relationships in the wool fibre supply chain are significantly less relative 
to measurement costs in the principal-agent relationships in the flax fibre supply chain.  
The difference in relative measurement costs leads to different vertical coordination 
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strategies between the supply chains according to the proposition developed in the 
framework.   
Proposition 3: When outcome measurement costs are high, closer vertical 
coordination will likely result. 
Extensive and credible wool testing that is recognized industry-wide in New 
Zealand and abroad makes outcome-based contracts between participants most efficient.  
There is very little asymmetric information in principal-agent relationships in the supply 
chain as a result of the extensive quality measurements of wool fibre.  Objective quality 
measurement of wool fibre eliminates the need for wool exporters to incur costs to 
monitor the effort, or behaviour of woolgrowers.  Wool exporters buy wool at auctions 
and the information regarding the wool that is provided in the catalogues is sufficient to 
make a purchase decision.  Wool exporters are able to fulfill the outcome-based contracts 
they have with spinning mills by viewing samples at the auction and reading the 
catalogue that includes all of the test information.  An auction mechanism for flax straw 
in Canada is not possible in part because there are no quality standards that processors 
could use to value straw samples.58       
Despite the high cost of measuring producer outcomes, the producer is 
compensated based on the tonnage of straw salvaged from the field.  Therefore, 
measurement costs of straw in the agency relationship between producers and processors 
do not appear to play a crucial role in shaping the relationship.  One would predict a 
behaviour-based relationship instead, given the high outcome measurement costs.  
However, the absence of information regarding proper straw management techniques 
makes a behaviour-based relationship inefficient as well.  Currently, research is 
                                                
58 The limited number of buyers of flax straw  makes auctions for flax straw ineffective also. 
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inconclusive regarding proper flax crop and straw management techniques that 
processors could monitor.  Therefore, the efficiency of a behaviour-based contract is 
compromised and measuring the tonnage of flax straw becomes a suitable proxy for the 
outcome of the producer.   
A behaviour-based contract is observed between processors and manufacturers in 
the downstream flax fibre supply chain.  Unlike wool fibre, flax fibre properties can not 
be specified in standardized contractual arrangements.  Therefore, a spot market type 
relationship between processors and manufacturers where the agreement is largely based 
on specific quality measurements of flax fibre is not possible.  As a result, manufacturers 
and processors enter into long-term highly vertically coordinated relationships in which 
compensation is not based on quality.  This is indeed the case as two processors of flax 
straw indicated they are compensated on a cost-plus basis, which is similar to a 
behaviour-based contract.     
Outcome uncertainty is another element of Agency theory that is included in the 
framework, and is examined below. 
5.10.4 Outcome Uncertainty 
Outcome uncertainty is often observed in the agricultural sector.  There are 
numerous factors that impact the quality of agricultural products that are beyond the 
control of primary producers.  Producers indicated that exogenous factors affecting the 
oilseed crop include the weather, health of the soil, and contamination of their field by 
people passing on nearby roads.  Most interviewees indicated that the most important 
factor affecting the variability of straw and fibre quality are the climatic conditions.  
Climatic conditions largely influence the success of the retting process, which in turn 
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largely determines the quality of the fibre.   Wool production is also characterized by 
outcome uncertainty, but to a lesser extent.  Woolgrowers generally choose a breed of 
sheep that suits the landscape and climatic conditions in their region.  Therefore, outcome 
uncertainty does not appear to play a large role in the relationship.   Proposition 3a dealt 
with outcome uncertainty: 
Proposition 3a: When outcome uncertainty increases, weaker vertical 
coordination is likely.   
Outcome uncertainty is a less important feature of transactions in the wool fibre 
supply chain compared to the flax fibre supply chain.  An outcome-based exchange 
relationship between woolgrowers and wool brokers is efficient since the woolgrower is 
willing to absorb the minimal amount of production risk stemming from climatic 
conditions.  Research indicated that outcome uncertainty at later stages of the wool fibre 
supply chain was not significant.   
Flax straw quality, on the other hand, is significantly impacted by weather 
conditions, creating a production risk.  This would theoretically lead to behaviour-based 
contracts between producers and processors.  The small amount of compensation that 
producers receive for their straw, makes them unwilling to accept risk stemming from 
outcome uncertainty.   The opposite was observed, however.  The effect of weather on 
the quality of straw actually led one Canadian processor to stop contracting with 
producers.  Given the abundance of flax straw on the prairies, processors prefer to 
observe weather patterns and base buying patterns on these observations.  Therefore, spot 
market transactions are most efficient with the high outcome uncertainty because it 
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preserves the processors opportunity to source straw from producers in areas with good 
cropping and retting conditions.   
Goal diversion between producers and processors of flax straw is also a major 
cause of outcome uncertainty in the flax fibre supply chain.  Producers manage their 
oilseed crop solely for maximizing oilseed yield and quality, not considering the effect on 
straw quality.  Since variability in flax straw translates into variability of flax fibre, 
outcome uncertainty also plays a major role in transactions between processors and 
manufacturers.  The high level of outcome uncertainty in the production of flax straw and 
fibre increases the efficiency of behaviour-based contracts to avoid shifting production 
risk to the agent in the transaction relationship.   Goal diversity does not exist to the same 
extent in the wool fibre supply chain.    Research indicated that sheep producers actively 
manage their flock for both the meat and the wool.  Sheep breeds are chosen that are most 
efficient for the type of landscape in the region as well as according to climatic 
conditions.  Judicious sheep selection thus decreases the degree of outcome uncertainty is 
therefore lower.  Producers gain approximately 25 percent of their revenue from the 
wool, which is a greater percentage than flax producers receive for their straw.59        
5.10.5 Bargaining Power 
To determine which party in each of the supply chains has the greatest level of 
bargaining power is not easy.  Interviewees in both industries said that relative bargaining 
power is determined by the market situation of the end product.  Especially in the wool 
fibre industry it was found that whether or not the carpet market is in decline strongly 
influenced which party holds relatively the most bargaining power.  For instance, when 
                                                
59 One New Zealand wool fibre industry expert mentioned that the percentage revenue woolgrowers derive 
from wool is declining due to declining wool prices, which results in weaker incentives to manage their 
sheep flock for the wool. 
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the carpet market is in decline, manufacturers and spinning mills have most of the 
bargaining power because of oversupply of wool fibre in the supply chain.  From the 
framework, the proposition regarding the effect of bargaining power on vertical 
coordination is as follows: 
Proposition 4: Unequal bargaining power leads to high exchange costs and 
closer vertical coordination. 
The processing sector is made up of only three processors on the prairies, thereby 
severely limiting the number of buyers of flax straw.  Considering the small number of 
processors, the producer is a price taker and faces a perfectly elastic demand curve for his 
flax straw.60  The monopsony power of processors puts producers, who are in a 
competitive market, at a relative bargaining disadvantage.  Interview responses by 
producers indicated that they do not appear to be very concerned with their lack of 
bargaining power in the supply chain.  The primary reason appears to be that producers 
view their straw as a waste by-product.  In addition, considering the small amount of 
compensation producers get for their flax straw, the loss in welfare from exposure to 
bargaining power currently is insignificant for producers.  Hence, the fact that unequal 
bargaining power is present in the producer-processor exchange relationship is not 
reflected in the cost of exchange.  If at a future date information about proper straw 
management techniques require asset specific investments, the inequality in bargaining 
power in the exchange relationship may serve as a significant exchange cost.   
The interviewees from the New Zealand wool fibre industry indicated that 
downstream manufacturers hold relatively the most bargaining power because of the 
declining demand for wool fibre products.  Neither the interviewees nor the current 
                                                
60 The flax straw market is therefore a buyers market. 
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literature on the industry indicated that the unequal bargaining power alone played a 
significant role in shaping exchange relationships.  Therefore, only in the processor-
manufacturer relationship in the Canadian flax fibre supply chain does bargaining power 
appear to influence the shape of the exchange relationship. 
When bargaining power is considered in conjunction with the degree of asset 
specificity in a transaction, however, the impact on vertical coordination may be more 
conclusive.  In a closely vertically coordinated relationship, such as a hierarchy, neither 
party benefits from exercising bargaining power or behaving opportunistically since the 
costly haggling and lack of cooperation often reduces joint profit.  The potential exposure 
to bargaining power and opportunistic behaviour makes closer vertical coordination more 
efficient.     
In the flax fibre sector the conjunction of both asset specificity and bargaining 
power appears to play a role in the downstream relationship between processors and 
manufacturers.  Both the processor and the manufacturer have to make investments in 
asset specific resources and both parties have bargaining power stemming from the lack 
of competition at these stages of the supply chain.  Close vertical coordination is indeed 
observed between processors and manufacturers since exchange costs are high.  Close 
vertical coordination is not observed in the downstream wool fibre industry because a 
declining market and competition among wool exporters ensures spinning mills gain 
favourable terms of trade without having to initiate a closely coordinated relationship.  
The final feature of the framework is the institutional environment in which the 
transaction takes place.  An assessment of the proposition regarding the impact of an 
underdeveloped institutional environment follows.          
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5.10.6 The Institutional Environment   
Institutions can facilitate transactions by lowering measurement costs and 
reducing uncertainty.  Transacting along a supply chain is costly in the absence of 
institutions that provide this information, and fortified business relationships are required 
to avoid the hold-up problem.  Development of an infant industry greatly benefits from 
institutions that reduce information asymmetries.  Therefore, institutions impact several 
facets of the transaction, and the following proposition was developed in the theoretical 
framework.   
Proposition 5: An underdeveloped institutional framework leads to high exchange 
costs, and closer vertical coordination. 
A comparison of the institutional environment between the two industries 
highlights several differences.  Exchanges in the wool fibre supply chain, as opposed to 
exchanges in the flax fibre supply chain, take place in a well-developed institutional 
environment.  The information regarding end-user markets, market prices, market trends 
and arbitration procedures available to participants in the New Zealand wool fibre 
industry is much greater in comparison to the availability of this type of information in 
the Canadian flax fibre supply chain.   
A quality and grading regime is well-established in New Zealand, reducing 
measurement costs for wool buyers and providing information regarding quality 
specifications that are useful for wool exporters and spinning mills to negotiate 
agreements.  A quality and grading regime also provides parties to the transaction with 
information that can be used to reduce future uncertainty and thus contractual gaps.   
Different production decisions to increase flax straw quality and reduce quality 
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variability can be made once feedback has been received from effective quality 
measurements.  Therefore, in addition to reducing uncertainty regarding the fair value of 
the production that is being exchanged, a quality and grading regime can also serve to 
further reduce future uncertainty for transacting parties.   
Wool fibre industry associations in New Zealand are also widespread and provide 
a breadth of R&D, especially to woolgrowers, spinning mills and manufacturers of 
carpet.  This information reduces uncertainty in the industry and thus exchange costs.  
For instance, the IWTO has an objective to ensure the functioning of the International 
Wool Textile Arbitration Agreement in wool production.   Therefore, this political 
institution provides information to supply chain participants regarding the outcome of 
potential contract breaches.  Uncertainty in the flax fibre supply chain is much higher in 
comparison, leading to relatively higher exchange costs.  The importance of trust in 
exchanges in the New Zealand wool fibre supply chain is diminished because of the 
objectivity of quality measurements.  Objective quality measurements reduce the need for 
trust in exchanges because these measurements are sufficient to determine the value of 
the wool.  The lack of objective quality measurements, combined with the lack of trust 
between new entrants in an infant flax fibre industry means exchange costs are high.  The 
strongly  coordinated relationship that is observed between processors and manufacturers 
can be attributed to the need to eliminate high exchange costs.   
5.11 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the validity of the theoretical framework developed in 
Chapter 4.  Business relationships in the Canadian flax fibre industry were compared with 
business relationships in the New Zealand wool fibre industry.  After an introduction to 
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each of the industries, the business relationships were characterized according to the 
concepts in the framework.  Tables comparing the transaction characteristics and vertical 
coordination strategies were developed.  An analysis of the different propositions was 
then possible.  The propositions were generally validated and additional insights into 
vertical coordination between parties were gained because of the combined effect of 
several of the transaction features.  The following chapter concludes this research and 
includes a brief discussion of conclusions and implications for the industry.   
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis.  It summarizes the key research findings and 
discusses some constraints to industry development that have been identified through the 
analysis of business relationships.    This chapter also includes a section that highlights 
limitations of the research, as well as areas for further research. 
The subject of the thesis is the flax fibre supply chain.  Supply chains of flax fibre 
are emerging in Canada, but at a significantly slower pace than would be expected 
considering the abundance of raw material and the large manufacturing sector that could 
utilize flax fibre.  Several issues were identified through background research that 
appeared to play a role in the slow development of the industry.  These issues included 
the infancy of the industry, the specificity of processing equipment and knowledge, the 
lack of research and development on the properties of flax fibre, the limited number of 
processors and manufacturers in the industry, and the absence of a recognized quality and 
grading regime for flax straw.  
The use of New Institutional Economic (NIE) theory to discover exchange costs 
and the slow development of the flax fibre industry was chosen in this thesis.   
Neoclassical economics could also have been used to examine the slow development of 
the industry.  An examination of the cost of production at different stages of the supply 
chain would have been required with the neoclassical approach.  While in-depth evidence 
of cost of production was not gathered during the interviews, it did not appear to be a 
constraint to industry development.  One element that may have been discovered with 
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using neoclassical economics is the impact of the unpredictability of straw quality on the 
cost effectiveness of the industry.  Considering that flax straw is a by-product in Canada, 
management of the flax crop is aimed at obtaining a high oilseed yield.  In addition, flax 
straw quality remains to a large extent dependent on the weather conditions for retting.  
Therefore, the inability of processors to influence straw quality through pricing schemes 
may transpire to have a large negative impact on the development of the industry. The 
high cost of production associated with the unpredictability of flax straw may play a large 
role in the under-development of the industry. 
A new approach was taken in this thesis that combined several different literatures 
within the NIE paradigm into one framework.  Previous research in NlE has generally 
focused on examining transactions from only one dimension.  Transaction Cost 
Economics is perhaps the most widely used theoretical approach when analyzing vertical 
coordination structures.  The different dimensions for examining transaction relationships 
have each been validated in previous research.  However, using each concept separately 
often leads to a limited explanation of vertical coordination.  The framework developed 
in this thesis is an attempt to more fully explain how transactions are organized along a 
supply chain.  Therefore, the overall objective of this thesis was to examine holistically 
the exchange costs in the flax fibre industry and the impact of these exchange costs on 
supply chain coordination and the development of the industry.   
6.2 Summary of Research Findings 
Insight into supply chain relationships was gained with the use of a framework 
developed in the thesis.  Each of the propositions from the different concepts of NIE was 
validated in the comparative case analysis.  Therefore, it can be concluded that not only 
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the characteristics of the transaction, but also the characteristics of the parties in the 
transaction, as well as the environment within which the transaction takes place 
influences vertical coordination strategies.  Each of these elements played a role in 
shaping business relationships.  Most importantly, it was found that the combined effect 
of various aspects of transactions played the largest role in shaping business 
relationships.  The underdeveloped institutional environment, in combination with 
various other aspects of transactions, led to prohibitively high exchange costs for forming 
business relationships. 
The institutional environment within which the transaction takes place is perhaps 
the most important factor in determining supply chain coordination in the flax fibre 
supply chain.  With its over-arching role in the framework, the institutional environment 
impacted the measurement costs and degree of uncertainty in business relationships.  The 
absence of a grading and quality system means the measurement costs of the agents 
output are high, making spot market transacting prohibitively expensive in the flax fibre 
supply chain.   
Objective quality measurements of wool fibre performed by testing houses 
accredited by the International Wool Textile Organization, on the other hand, plays a 
crucial role in making the auction system possible in New Zealand.  Wool exporters rely 
on the information regarding the cleanliness of the fibre, the fibre diameter or micron, 
and colour when making purchasing decisions to fulfill their contracts with spinning 
mills.  Quality and grade information significantly reduces the costs of acquiring 
information to reduce information asymmetries between wool buyers and sellers and thus 
makes easily formed spot market relationships feasible.   
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The type of business relationship that prevails between producers and processors 
in the Canadian flax fibre industry is largely influenced by the fact that producers and 
processors view flax straw as a by-product.  In New Zealand, on the other hand, wool 
fibre is viewed as a valuable co-product that generates 25 percent of revenues for sheep 
farmers.  Producers view flax straw as a costly nuisance and they are therefore willing to 
sell their straw for any price.61  Currently, farmers receive around $6 per tonne of flax 
straw, which is about $4 per acre of oilseed flax.  When these prices are compared to 
oilseed returns that are currently approximately $150 per acre (SAFRR, 2004), it 
becomes obvious that the revenues generated from straw are insignificant in comparison 
to the oilseed crop.    
6.3 Constraints to Industry Development 
There are various hurdles that must first be overcome before the flax fibre 
industry can enjoy rapid growth.  The premise of this research is that the lack of 
development in the industry is in part due to the costs associated with establishing closely 
vertically coordinated exchange relationships.    This thesis examined the impact of high 
market exchange costs on vertical coordination strategies and the resultant likelihood of 
investors to commit resources.   
NIE literature states that the most efficient vertical coordination strategy results 
given the transaction characteristics and exchange costs.  While establishing closely 
vertically coordinated relationships are most efficient in terms of minimizing market 
exchange costs, new costs associated with administering vertical flows of product and 
organizing factors of production are incurred (Hobbs, 1996).  While carrying out the 
                                                
61 Some producers even indicated they would even give their straw for free to the processor just so they 
could get rid of it. 
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transaction internally is the most efficient, it may only be marginally so when there are 
high search and negotiation costs associated with establishing closely vertically 
coordinated relationships.  For instance, the search costs associated with finding an 
exchange party to a long-term contract are likely higher than the search costs associated 
with finding a party for an exchange on the spot market.  Similarly, setting up a long-term 
exchange, that necessitates negotiation of several contractual stipulations to account for 
future events, leads to higher negotiation costs than standardized spot market 
transactions.  Therefore, the close vertical coordination in the flax fibre supply chain may 
be most efficient in terms of transaction costs, but the development of the industry may 
nevertheless be hindered.  This notion is reinforced by several responses from 
interviewees who indicated that commercialization of the fibre into different 
manufacturing industries was a reason for slow growth in the industry.  
Slow development of the industry is in part attributable to the absence of a 
grading and quality regime.  According to Barzel (2004) a grading and quality regime 
that is state-enforced moves an economy to perfect competition where spot market 
transactions are the norm.  Therefore, along with a grading and quality regime, state 
enforcement is necessary, as well as considerable care must be given to how and which 
standards arise. How the industry develops will be influenced by the type of standards 
that are developed.  Therefore, while a grading and quality regime is necessary in the 
industry, there are some aspects that must be carefully considered. 
Further development of the industry will require producers to manage their straw 
to increase fibre content and quality.  This will allow the fibre to be used in applications 
other than pulp and paper milling.  The current pricing system of straw, however, 
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eliminates any incentive for producers to manage their straw.  A fixed pricing system is 
in place partly due to the high costs of quality measurements. Under the current pricing 
scheme there is no price premium for higher quality straw.  Therefore, there is currently 
no incentive for producers to manage their straw to obtain a higher quality because the 
price is irrelevant to quality attributes.  In addition, the low price that producers receive 
for their straw is neither conducive to performing any straw management practices.   The 
nuisance of handling the flax straw makes producers eager to hand over their straw to 
processors, at any price.    
The lack of research and development on flax fibre properties is also a constraint 
to industry development and makes exchanges costly.  Commercialization of the flax 
fibre into different industries is difficult because of the lack of knowledge on how flax 
fibre can be utilized in different processes.  R&D into the potential viability of the 
industry is also minimal, limiting interest by potential investors.  The lack of information 
about flax fibre properties, and the industry in general, creates high exchange costs, 
especially considering that asset specific investments have to be made by both processors 
and manufacturers.   The risk of opportunism is a reality every time contractual 
renegotiations have to take place as a result of contractual gaps.  Therefore, lack of 
research and development on flax fibre properties means the information necessary to 
reduce environmental uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic behaviour does not exist.  
Both uncertainty and risk of opportunism stemming from a lack of R&D in the industry 
create a hold up in establishing business relationships.   
Industry associations play an important role in the success of the New Zealand 
wool fibre industry.  They collect funds from woolgrowers and government to organize, 
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and in some cases conduct, research and development activities.  Industry associations 
that direct their resources to promoting the flax fibre industry through research would fill 
the institutional vacuum that is currently present in the Canadian flax fibre industry.     
6.4 The Potential for Flax Fibre in the Biobased Economy 
The potential for flax fibre in the biobased economy is very good because of the 
superior qualities of flax fibre compared to several other natural fibres.  However, a 
substantial amount of research and development must be done on flax fibre properties.  
Considering that flax fibre will replace non-renewable resources to convert traditional 
products into bioproducts, research regarding the effect on end product properties is 
needed.  In addition to technical research, market research on the willingness-to-pay for 
bioproducts is needed.  While research has indicated thus far that flax fibre is 
advantageous in various applications, it is an expensive alternative.  Consumers must be 
willing to pay a price premium for a product containing flax fibre.      
The market value of the bioproduct must be high enough that it allows 
manufacturers to pay a premium for high quality fibre.  A similar incentive needs to exist 
for producers to manage their straw.   Assuming that bioproduct manufacturers require 
fibres with certain properties, research on appropriate straw management practices as 
well as fibre handling practices is needed.  Therefore, market and technical research is 
needed for flax fibre to succeed in the bioproducts market.   
6.5 Limitations of the Research 
As with any other economic research material, this thesis contains some 
weaknesses.  Perhaps the largest weakness is the inability to measure the costs of 
transacting.  Exchange costs are compared between the two different supply chains, but 
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there is no absolute measurement of transaction costs in either of the two supply chains.  
A survey such as the one performed by Hobbs (1997) that measured transaction costs in 
the UK cattle market was possible because of a larger number of producers in the supply 
chain and a number of different cattle marketing channels in that industry.  The infancy 
of the Canadian flax fibre industry means that there are only three processors of flax 
straw commercially operating.  This meant that the survey technique to measure 
transaction costs was not feasible.  In addition, while all processors of flax straw in 
Canada were interviewed, the sample size remains very small.  Therefore, conclusions 
regarding vertical coordination from such a small sample size should be treated with 
caution.  A survey of participants in the New Zealand wool fibre industry would have 
been possible because of the large number of woolgrowers, wool brokers and wool 
exporters.  However, for a comparative analysis, a case study approach to the New 
Zealand wool fibre industry was necessary.  A survey of participants in the New Zealand 
wool fibre industry would have provided more information for the analysis.       
6.6 Areas of Further Research   
Further research that is supportive of using a framework approach in investigating 
supply chain coordination would be beneficial.  For instance, comparing the predictions 
of the framework, to the predictions of only one concept of New Institutional Economics 
regarding supply chain coordination would be useful.  Therefore, measuring the 
improved predictive capacity of supply chain coordination the framework approach 
provides would be a logical next step in this type of research.   
The concepts included in the framework were tailored to provide insight into 
transactions along the flax fibre supply chain.  Therefore, this framework may not be 
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highly suited for examining relationships in other supply chains.  Creating a different 
framework that is applicable to many different industries would allow it to be widely 
applied.  Transaction Cost Economics, for instance, is applicable across many different 
supply chains.   
Each of the interview participants indicated that trust is an important component 
of business relationships.  Trust is a social institution between individuals, or firms, that 
is generally built over time.  Expansion of the framework to include concepts outside of 
the economics literature may be beneficial in gaining greater insight into why and how 
business relationships form.  Another sociological aspect of transactions that may be 
further explored is the impact of bounded rationality of individuals in deciphering the 
information from the institutional environment.  The bounded rationality of individuals 
can be further explored to gain insight into how information from institutions is received 
and subsequently utilized in shaping business relationships.     
The slow development of the flax fibre industry can also be examined using a 
different approach, namely the neoclassical approach.  The slow development of the 
industry could also be attributed to the high costs associated with production at the 
different stages of the supply chain.  These high costs of production may stem from 
deficient knowledge regarding flax straw harvesting techniques, deficient technology to 
extract the fibre cost effectively or the unpredictability of straw quality that makes it less 
lucrative for processors.  Therefore, research that explores the flax fibre industry costs of 
production as well as the benefits would provide another perspective on the slow growth 
of the industry.  
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6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This research was an attempt at developing a framework to analyze the 
governance of business relationships along a developing supply chain.  Recent New 
Institutional Economics literature indicated that business relationships have to be 
examined through various different lenses.  Four different dimensions were used to 
examine supply chain coordination in the flax fibre supply chain.  By investigating the 
costliness of exchanging in the flax fibre supply chain, insights were provided regarding 
constraints to industry development.  The costs of exchanging in the flax fibre supply 
chain, which is attributable to various features of the transaction, may be so high in some 
cases that investors are discouraged from entering the industry.  One of the main sources 
of high exchange costs stems from an underdeveloped institutional environment that fails 
to reduce the uncertainty and high outcome measurement costs in exchange relationships.  
Further development of the industry therefore requires a quality and grading regime, as 
well as R&D that infuses information into exchange relationships to reduce contractual 
gaps stemming from uncertainty.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A1 - Industry Expert Interview Guide 
University of Saskatchewan 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Date _________________ 
Time  _________________ 
Location  _________________ 
Company/Role in Supply Chain  _________________ 
Contact  _________________ 
 
 
General information on business relationships and industry environment 
The following questions are about the business relationships between supply chain 
participants.     
  
1. What is/are currently the most common type(s) of exchange relationship between 
producers, processors and manufacturers in the industry? (e.g. contractual, mutual 
understanding, not in a committed relationship) 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
a.  Would you consider each of them to be long-term relationship? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
2. How did each of these business relationships start?  (e.g which party initiated the 
exchange relationship)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
 3. To your knowledge were there any significant obstacles either of the parties had 
to overcome to enter each of these business relationships? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
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4. Do transactions generally occur with the same buyers/suppliers over a period of 
time? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
5. When business is conducted with the same buyers/suppliers are new contractual 
terms set up every time, or do the previous contractual terms generally apply? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
6. What determines the frequency of each of the transactions (e.g. production, 
market demand, the buyer)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
7. What role does trust play in each of the business relationships in the industry? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In your opinion, what types of things either break trust or reinforce trust between 
participants in the industry. 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
9. How is straw/wool/fibre priced at each stage of the supply chain?   
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Are there any brokers or middlemen present in the industry?  If so, what role do 
they play in the supply chain? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. How would you describe the competitive environment at each stage of the 
production process (e.g. competitive, few firms, only one firm)? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
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(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Who has the most bargaining power in the supply chain? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Why does this party have more bargaining power? 
________________________________________________________________  
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. What does he have bargaining power over? 
________________________________________________________________  
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Investments 
 
The following questions are regarding investments that industry participants had to make 
in order to enter the industry.  Only those investments that are specific to producing 
wool, straw or fibre are of interest in this section.  
 
13. Are there any requirements of investing in specialized equipment that essentially 
lock the parties into a bilateral exchange relationship.  
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Why did producers/processors/final manufacturers locate where they did  (i.e. 
were there any requirements by the buyer or seller to locate near to their operation)? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________  
 
(M)______________________________________________________________                      
 
15. Did either of the parties have to invest time and resources into learning, or 
otherwise hire trained personnel? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________   
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(M)______________________________________________________________   
 
16. To your knowledge were any parties concerned about the lock-in relationship 
these investments created? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Do you think that the nature of the business relationship changed because of the 
investments that had to be made (e.g. did the exchange relationship become more 
fortified through formal contracts)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
  
18. Do you know of cases when potential participants withheld making the necessary 
investments because they did not want to be in a locked-in relationship with a buyer? 
(P)_____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Information 
The following questions are about the sources of information in each of the business 
relationships regarding prices, contract terms, including quality specifications and the 
reputation of the parties. 
   
19. Where can supply chain participants get information about current prices (e.g. 
industry association market reports, the buyer)? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
  
20. Is there a source of information about the reputation or past performance of 
industry participants that everyone can access? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. What is the screening process (if there is one) to select parties to exchange with 
(e.g. capabilities, reputation)?   
________________________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Where do industry participants get information about the specific quality 
specifications that their product should meet (e.g. industry associations, buyers)? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
23. To your knowledge how have exchange agreements been affected by the lack of 
information about any of the above factors? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Are you aware of any industry associations? (e.g. market reports, list of reputable 
buyers/suppliers or intermediaries)? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. What kind of information do they provide producers/processors/final 
manufacturers with? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Product quality level and variability 
The following questions are about the level of quality of straw/wool/fibre product as well 
as the variability of the level of quality of the product. 
 
25. What factors impact the level of quality of the product that are beyond the control 
of the participants at each stage of the supply chain? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Are there any elements in the business relationship that account for unexpected 
changes in quality levels?  How? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
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(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
27. What causes variability in the quality of straw/fibre/wool products that are beyond 
the control of participants? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Are there any elements in the business relationship that account for significant 
variability in quality (e.g. a range of quality per price point, contract with more suppliers 
to cover production shortfalls)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
29. Is there a quality and grading system present in the industry that all supply chain 
participants can make use of? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. Briefly, how are product quality measurements done at each stage of the 
production process? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Do you feel that it is useful and accurate? Why or Why not? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. How have quality and grade measurements impacted the exchange relationships 
in the industry (e.g. made them easier to establish, compensation is mainly based on 
quality)? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. Are there any government initiatives that have helped participants in the industry 
(e.g. direct financial assistance through subsidies of production, R&D programs about 
straw/fibre/wool, assistance in marketing)? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________________ 
   
33. In your opinion, how important are these types of initiatives to the continued 
success of the industry? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. To your knowledge, have disputes arisen between participants in the industry? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. To your knowledge, have there been any disputes that had to be solved by 
a legal or an arbitration system? 
________________________________________________________________ 
   
 
Additional Comments 
35. Now that you have been exposed to some of the factors that may impact the 
exchange relationships in the industry, are there any factor(s) that impact supply chain 
relationships that have not been covered in this interview?  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. Can you identify key factors for establishing a successful for flax/wool fibre 
industry? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
37. What are key constraints/challenges to the further development of the flax/wool 
fibre industry? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
THE END 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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Appendix A2 - Supply Chain Participant Interview Guide 
University of Saskatchewan 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Date _________________ 
Time  _________________ 
Location  _________________ 
Company/Role in Supply Chain  _________________ 
Contact  _________________ 
 
 
General information on business relationships and industry environment 
 
The following questions are about the business relationships between you and parties at 
other stages of production along the flax/wool fibre supply chain.     
  
1. Which firms do you have a business relationship with along the flax/wool fibre 
supply chain (excluding transportation companies but including brokers or agents)? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
2. How would you characterize your business relationship with each of these? (e.g. 
contractual, mutual understanding, not in a committed relationship) 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Were there any significant obstacles you had to overcome to enter any of these 
business relationships? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
4. How long have you been in this business relationship? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
5. What determines the frequency of each of the transactions (e.g. production, 
market demand, the buyer)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
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(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
  
6. When repeat business is done with the same party are new contractual terms set 
up every time, or do the previous contractual terms generally apply? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
7. How did each of these business relationships start?  (e.g which party initiated the 
exchange relationship)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
8. How important is it to have trust in your business relationship(s)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In your opinion, what types of things either break trust or reinforce trust in your 
business relationship(s)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
10. How is your straw/wool/fibre priced?   
(P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Are there any brokers or middlemen present in the industry?  If so, do you make 
use of brokers or middlemen? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. What kind of a business relationship do you have with the 
broker/middleman? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
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12. How would you describe the competitive environment at each stage of the 
production process (e.g. competitive, few firms, only one firm)? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Who has the most bargaining power in the supply chain? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Why does this party have more bargaining power? 
________________________________________________________________  
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. What does he have bargaining power over? 
________________________________________________________________  
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Are there any government initiatives that have helped participants in the industry 
(e.g. direct financial assistance through subsidies of production, R&D programs about 
straw/fibre/wool, assistance in marketing)? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
   
a. In your opinion, how important are these types of initiatives to the 
continued success of the industry? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. To your knowledge, have disputes arisen between participants in the industry? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. To your knowledge, have there been any disputes that had to be solved by 
a legal or an arbitration system? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Investments 
The following questions are regarding investments that you had to make in order to enter 
the industry.  Only those investments that are specific to producing wool, straw or fibre 
are of interest in this section.  
 
16. Is it necessary to make investments in specialized equipment to enter the business 
relationship and essentially locks you into a bilateral exchange relationship because it is 
not valuable outside of the relationship?  
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Why did you locate where you did?   
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________  
 
(M)______________________________________________________________                      
 
18. Did you have to invest time and resources into learning, or otherwise hire trained 
personnel when you entered into the business relationship? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________   
 
(M)______________________________________________________________   
 
19. Were you concerned about the lock-in business relationship these investments 
created? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Do you think that the nature of the business relationship changed because of the 
investments you had to make (e.g. did the exchange relationship become more fortified 
through formal contracts)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
  
(Buyers only) 
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21. Do you know of cases when potential suppliers withheld making the necessary 
investments because they did not want to be in a locked-in relationship with you? 
(P)_____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Information 
The following questions are about the sources of information in each of your business 
relationships regarding prices, contract terms, including quality specifications and the 
reputation of the parties. 
   
22. Where do you get information about current prices (e.g. industry association 
market reports, the buyer)? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
  
23. When you first entered the business relationship, did you have any information 
about the reputation of the other party?    
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
24. How did you screen potential parties to do business with before you entered into a 
business relationship? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Where do you get information about the specific quality specifications that your 
product should meet (e.g. industry associations, buyers)? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
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26. In your business relationships, have you ever felt that you did not have enough 
information about any of the above elements?  If so, how did this affect your business 
relationship?  
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
27. Are you aware of any flax/wool fibre industry associations? (e.g. flax council of 
Canada, Saskflax)? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
a. What kind of information do they provide you with? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Product quality and variability 
The following questions are about the level of quality of straw/wool/fibre product as well 
as the variability of the level of quality of the product. 
 
28. What factors impact the level of quality of your straw/wool/fibre that are beyond 
your control? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
 
29. Are there any elements in business relationships with buyers/suppliers that 
account for unexpected changes in quality levels?  What are they? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
30. What causes variability in the quality of your straw/fibre/wool that are beyond 
your control? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)______________________________________________________________ 
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31. Are there any elements in the business relationship with buyers/suppliers that 
account for significant variability in quality (e.g. a range of quality per price point, 
contract with more suppliers to cover production shortfalls)? 
(P-P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(P-M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
32. How is your straw/wool/fibre quality measured and graded? 
(P)______________________________________________________________ 
 
(P)____________________________________________________________ 
 
(M)____________________________________________________________ 
 
a. Do you feel that it is useful and accurate? Why or Why not? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Additional Comments 
 
33. Now that you have been exposed to some of the factors that may impact your 
business relationships in the flax/wool fibre industry, are there any factor(s) that impact 
your business relationships that have not been covered in this interview?  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Can you identify key factors for establishing a successful flax/wool fibre 
industry? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. What are key constraints/challenges to the further development of the flax/wool 
fibre industry? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
THE END 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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Oilseed Managed Straw for Processing - Processing Flow Chart 
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